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FOREWORD 
The public provision of urban facilities and services often 
takes the form of a few central supply points serving a large 
number of spatially dispersed demand points: for example, 
hospitals, schools, libraries, and emergency services such as 
fire and police. A fundamental characteristic of such systems 
is the spatial separation between suppliers and consumers. No 
market signals exist to identify efficient and inefficient geo- 
graphical arrangements, thus the location problem is one that 
arises in both East and West, in planned and in market economies. 
This problem is being studied at IIASA by the Public Facil- 
ity Location Task (formerly the Normative Location Modeling Task) 
which started in 1979. The expected results of this Task are a 
comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of current theories and 
applications, an established network of international contacts 
among scholars and institutions in different countries, a frame- 
work for comparison, unification, and generalization of existing 
approaches, as well as the formulation of new problems and 
approaches in the field of optimal location theory. 
This paper is a revised and extended version of several 
technical notes on public facility location written since 
October 1979.  The two principal parts of the paper by Giorgio 
Leonardi, leader of the Public Facility Location Task, are 
relatively selfcontained. The first is a nontechnical descrip- 
tion of the proposed general framework for analyzing location 
problems, the second describes mathematical models for static, 
single-service, facility location problems and their possible 
extensions and improvements. 
A list of publications in the Public Facility Location 
Series appears at the end of this paper. 
Andrei Rogers 
Chairman 
Human Settlements 
-iii- and Services Area 
ABSTRACT 
T h i s  paper ,  a condensed r e p o r t  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t a t e  of  t h e  
work i n  t h e  P u b l i c  F a c i l i t y  L oca t i on  Task ( fo rmer ly  t h e  Normative 
L o c a t i o n  Modeling Task) a t  IIASA, ha s  t h r e e  main aims.  The f i r s t  
i s  t o  b u i l d  a g e n e r a l  framework f o r  l o c a t i o n  problems.  The second 
i s  t o  u s e  t h i s  framework t o  u n i f y  e x i s t i n g  l o c a t i o n  models. The 
t h i r d  i s  to  use  t h e  framework t o  deve lop  new, m o r e  g e n e r a l ,  and 
more meaningful  l o c a t i o n  models.  F i n a l l y ,  s u g g e s t i o n s  a r e  g ive n  
on  how t o  i n t r o d u c e  m u l t i p l e  s e r v i c e s  and m u l t i p l e  t i m e  p e r i o d s  
i n  l o c a t i o n  problems. T h e m u l t i a c t i v i t y  dynamic l o c a t i o n  models 
t h a t  t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e  g e n e r a t e s  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  
i n  t h e  P u b l i c  F a c i l i t y  Loca t ion  Task. 
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A UNIFYING FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC 
FACILITY LOCATION PROBLEMS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Public Facility Location (PFL) Task, formerly called the 
Normative Location Modeling Task, was undertaken in a rather 
exploratory way in October 1979, within the Human Settlements 
and Services Area at IIASA. In spite of the esoteric-sounding 
terminology, the PFL problem is one that is experienced daily 
and can be rephrased as: How can the location of public services 
and facilities be planned in an optimal way? A first step is to 
put aside the problem of the precise definition of such terms as 
"planning", "location", "public", "service", and "optimal", and 
focus our attention instead on operational tools, a topic already 
containing a vast amount of literature. 
To begin a study of location modeling the following general 
goals are useful. 
A comprehensive review of the existing theoretical and 
applied literature on optimal location should be made. 
After this has been done a state-of-the-art review of 
all work on optimal location modeling should be assembled. 
Simultaneously an international communication network 
among scientists working on location problems should be 
built. 
Although the above goals have actually been implemented and have 
been found useful, as the work progresses, more precise defini- 
tions are soon required. 
By far the main unsolved problem in this field of study 
is the lack of interdisciplinary work. Although this 
statement sounds just as general as the three main goals, 
it is not. A glance at the literature on location 
problems is enough to realize that most approaches and 
results are as diverse and scattered as the different 
trainings and backgrounds of their authors. It is for 
this reason that international cooperation among scholars 
studying location problems is important. 
In order to estabfish an efficient interdisciplinary 
study,general unifying frameworks are required for 
location problems. This seems to be the most promising 
way to approach the state-of-the-art review on the sub- 
ject, and the most likely way for IIASA to make an 
original theoretical contribution. 
If optimal location problems are not to be doomed to the 
realm of mathematical skill games, they must be related 
to the more general and realistic problem of planning 
optimal locational structures for interacting urban 
activity systems. This is likely to be the most promis- 
ing applied IIASA contribution. 
With these goals in mind, work has begun at IIASA and some 
results have been achieved. The purpose of this paper is to 
present this work, first by stating the limitations and short- 
comings of the present state of the research and then by point- 
ing to the main achievements and suggested approaches for further 
research. 
There are four main shortcomings to this research. First, 
a general theory has yet to be developed, although some unifying 
issues have been exploited. However, it must be said that the 
path towards unification is not really difficult; it simply 
requires some time and effort. This path proves itself to be a 
fruitful one. 
Second, some important approaches to the study of location 
modeling are lacking, due to limitations in time and knowledge. 
Among them, mention should be made of the multiobjective approach, 
the voting decision procedures, and the use of pricing policies 
(parallel tolor alternative to, physical stocks planning). 
Third, deep analysis of the relevant welfare theory behind 
the optimization models has not been carried out. This seems 
indeed to be one of the most promising issues for future research, 
both on a microeconomic and on a macroeconomic scale. 
Fourth, some algorithmic problems are still waiting for a 
rigorous solution, although heuristic tools that give good 
solutions are available. This is another strand of future 
research, and a challenge for applied mathematicians. 
The main achievements and suggested approaches for future 
research can be categorized into three groups beginning with the 
physical interpretation of results, solutions, and main proper- 
ties. This approach has always been kept in mind, and easily 
understandable rules-of-thumb have been sought and suggested 
when possible. The general direction implied here is that 
a qualitative understanding of the problem structure is some- 
times more useful than being able to generate numerical solutions. 
Although this issue is listed among the achievements, it must be 
said that just the top of the iceberg has been scratched, and a 
considerable amount of work is needed along this path. 
The second main asset of this study is that all the newly 
proposed models have been built ori existing ones, always included 
as special cases. This is a suggested standard for future 
research; nothing has to be thrown away, everything can be used 
as a start for generalization. This is not just a theoretical 
issue, as it may appear to be at first sight. Including existing 
problems as special cases usually implies being able to general- 
ize special problems, as well as solution techniques. 
The last main contribution of this work is the more realistic 
assumptions that have been introduced for users' behavior. This 
approach also is just in the beginning sta%e, and the problem 
behind it is worth further theoretical and empirical research. 
2. GENERAL ISSUES 
2.1 The Facility Location System 
Broadly speaking, the general aim of a location pattern, for 
a given set of public facilities, is twofold: 
1.  To be as near as possible to the demand, in order to 
reduce transport costs 
2. To keep the cost of establishing the facilities as low as 
possible, both by choosing low-cost locations and by 
reducing the number of facilities to be established 
Since these two goals are usually in conflict, some trade-off 
has to be found between them. The need for such a trade-off is 
the reason why nontrivial location problems exist. 
In order to build a general framework, it is useful to split 
the location problem into two subproblems. 
The first is the problem of aZZocation, where the trans- 
portation pattern between the demand locations and the 
service facilities is decided. The allocation problem 
is thus mainly concerned with the first goal of reducing 
transport costs. 
The second is the problem of facility Zocation, where 
the locations of the facilities are chosen. The loca- 
tion problem is thus mainly concerned with the second 
goal of lowecost location. 
Of course, the allocation and location subproblems are 
related and cannot be solved separately. However, this does not 
mean that they are both controlled by the same decision maker, 
nor that the possible two decision makers agree. In the most 
general case, the way the two subproblems interact is shown in 
Figure 1. 
Two formal operators have been introduced: the Zocator and 
the aZZocator. They are defined below: 
1. Locator's decision - the locator operates as follows: 
-- compares the current location and size of existing 
facilities with the demand allocated to them 
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-- evaluates the costs and benefits associated 
with the current state of the system and with 
its possible changes 
-- generates a new pattern of sizes and location 
of facilities, both by establishing new facil- 
ities and by demolishing old ones (Of course, 
building and demolition costs are taken into 
account at this stage.) 
-- 
2. Allocator 's dkcision - the allocator operates as foilows: 
-- compares the potential demand from each demand 
location, the existing size and location of 
facilities, and the transport costs (not neces- 
sarily measured in terms of money) between the 
demand and the facility location 
-- generates a pattern of trips between the demand 
and facility locations, taking into account both 
transport costs and available capacity 
In order to have a better understanding of how the allocator 
works, it is useful to make a further division into two subsystems. 
The first of these is the accessibility-sensitive d e m a n d  mechan- 
ism. In many services the total actual demand cannot be estimated 
beforehand; rather, it depends on the location, size, and prox- 
imity of the facilities. Usually, the demand will increase' with 
the accessibility of the service and is, therefore, acessibility- 
sensitive. The accessibility-sensitive demand mechanism receives 
as inputs the potential demand (i.e., the maximum demand which 
can be generated) and the evaluation of the accessibility to the 
service for each demand location. It then generates the actual 
demand from each demand location, as a fraction of the potential 
demand, according to some accessibility non-decreasing function. 
The second subsystem necessary in the allocator's decision 
is the congestion-sensitive demand mechanism. Just as demand 
can be generated by high accessibility to the service, it can 
also be discouraged by overcrowded facilities. An example where 
both mechamisms operate is leisure and recreational facilities. 
Usually, the higher the availability and nearness of swimming 
pools, the higher will be the number of people using them. On 
the other hand, if a swimming pool is overcrowded, people will 
tend to look for another one, or maybe go back home. Therefore, 
the congestion-sensitive demand mechanism receives as inputs the 
actual demand from each location, the location and size of 
facilities in each location, and the transport costs between 
demand and facility locations. It then generates the evalua- 
tion of accessibility from each demand location (accounting for 
both nearness and congestion) and the travel pattern between 
demand and facility locations. 
The interaction between the two allocator subsystems is 
perhaps better understood if rephrased in dynamic terms. Start- 
ing with some a p r i o r i  estimate of accessibility, the 
accessibility-sensitive demand mechanism generates a demand. 
This demand is fed into the congestion-sensitive demand mechan- 
ism, which then allocates it to facilities, evaluates the result- 
ing congestion in each facility, accounts for this in evaluating 
a new estimate of accessibility, and sends this information as 
a feedback to the accessibility-sensitive demand mechanism. A 
new actual demand, depending on the new congestion-reduced 
accessibility evaluation, is thus generated, and the same process 
is repeated over and over, until some equilibrium state is 
reached, provided it exists. 
2.2 The Service Mechanism 
2 . 2 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The general qualitative framework defined in Section 2.1 is 
wide enough to include most service location problems. However, 
it does not give answers to such questions as: Who are the 
locators and the allocators? How much do they agree or disagree? 
Who (or what) is traveling, where is he (or it) traveling to and 
why? Who is paying for travel costs? Who is paying for 
establishing facilities? 
Most of these questions can be given a definite answer only 
by introducing a definite kind of service. However, some useless 
generality can be eliminated by assuming that all public services 
and f a c i l i t i e s  s h a r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e a s o n a b l e  f e a t u r e s  and 
p r o p e r t i e s .  
a.  The l o c a t o r  i s  a  p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t y ;  he  b a s i c a l l y  a g r e e s  
w i t h  t h e  u s e r s  and t h e i r  g o a l s  ( t h e  c a s e  of t h e  "bad 
t y r a n t "  w i l l  be n e g l e c t e d ) ,  and sometimes h e  may a l s o  be 
assumed t o  be t h e  u s e r  h i m s e l f .  
b. The l o c a t o r ,  a  p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t y ,  pays  f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  
t h e  s e r v i c e  f a c i l i t i e s .  
c.  No l o c a t i o n - d e p e n d e n t  c o s t  i s  charged  t o  u s e r s ,  w i t h  t h e  
o n l y  e x c e p t i o n  of p o s s i b l e  t r a v e l  c o s t s ,  which c a n n o t  be 
e l i m i n a t e d  and are t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  market - independent .  
Note t h a t  no s p e c i a l  a s sumpt ion  f o r  t h e  a l l o c a t o r  h a s  been 
i n t r o d u c e d .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  v a r y i n g  b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  
a l l o c a t o r  which i s  t h e  v e r y  r e a s o n  d i f f e r e n t  s e r v i c e  mechanisms 
can  be found.  The d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  p u b l i c  d e c i s i o n  maker 
and t h e  u s e r s  may be s h a r p  o r  weak, a s  shown by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
ext reme c a s e s .  When t h e  same d e c i s i o n  maker c o n t r o l s  b o t h  t h e  
l o c a t o r  and t h e  a l l o c a t o r ,  t h a t  i s ,  when t h e r e  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  
between p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  and u s e r s ,  a l l  c o s t s  ( t r a v e l  and 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  c o s t s )  are p a i d  by t h e  u s e r s .  An example o f  how 
t h i s  may happen i s  t h e  U S  pr imary  s c h o o l  sys tem,  where u s e r s  pay 
l o c a t i o n - d e p e n d e n t  t a x e s  and a t  t h e  same t i m e  c o n t r o l  t o  some 
e x t e n t  t h e  l o c a t i o n ,  s i z e ,  and a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  own s c h o o l  
f a c i l i t i e s .  The U S  c a s e  d o e s  n o t  h o l d  i n  most  European c o u n t r i e s ,  
where t h e  v e r y  o p p o s i t e  c a n  sometimes be found.  I n  I t a l y ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  overhead  ( l o c a t i o n - i n d e p e n d e n t )  t a x e s  a r e  p a i d  f o r  
pr imary  s c h o o l s ,  b u t  l o c a t i o n  and a l l o c a t i o n  a r e  c e n t r a l l y  p lanned  
by a  p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t y ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  a l l o c a t i o n s  may some- 
times be i n  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  u s e r s '  p r e f e r e n c e s .  
The above examples f o c u s  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  on two main f a m i l i e s  
of s e r v i c e  mechanisms: s e r v i c e s  where t h e  same d e c i s i o n  maker 
c o n t r o l s  l o c a t i o n  and a l l o c a t i o n ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  a s  
d e l i v e r y  sys tems ,  and s e r v i c e s  where l o c a t i o n  and a l l o c a t i o n  a r e  
c o n t r o l l e d  by d i f f e r e n t  d e c i s i o n  makers ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  u s e r s  
a t t r a c t i n g  sys tems .  
2 . 2 .  2 D e Zi v e ry  S y s t e m s  
A delivery system is defined in the following way. 
The same decision maker (usually a public authority 
and/or an agency) controls location of facilities and 
allocation of services to users. 
Users do not travel; that is, service is delivered from 
the facilities to the users, and transport costs are not 
charged to the users. 
Every cost (including transportation) is paid by the 
same public decision maker. 
There are many examples of delivery systems of which three 
are mentioned here. Fire emergency services fulfill the three 
requirements, as long as no bill has to be paid for fire services. 
Police patrol systems is a second example of delivery systems. 
Health care emergency (or ambulance) systems, can also be consid- 
ered as delivery systems, as long as the decision to use them is 
not affected by transport costs and is therefore price-insensi- 
tive. 
The main distinguishing feature of delivery systems is the 
direction and kind of transport flows. Transport always takes 
place from facility locations to demand locations, and users 
do not travel; they are served at home. A delivery system is 
the simplest location problem one can conceive, since no 
conflicting goals arise (except for the usual transport-location 
trade-off problem). No user's behavior model is needed, since 
users do not behave at all in such systems (the reasonable 
assumption of accessibility and congestion insensitive demand 
is implied here for such systems - hopefully one does not set 
a fire just because he lives near to a fire station), and every 
cost is paid (or can be assumed to be paid) by the same decision 
maker. The typical direction of transport flows in a delivery 
system is shown in Figure 2. 
It may be useful to point out that a delivery system 
closely resembles the classical "plant-location" or "warehouse- 
location" problems used in private sector locational decisions 
and found in the operations research and management science 
literature (Balinski, 1961;  Efroymson and Ray, 1 9 6 6 ;  ReVelle and 
service facilities 
demand locations 
service delivery from service facilities to dezand 
locations 
Figure 2. Typical delivery-system flow pattern. 
Rojeski, 1970; Hansen and Kaufman, 1976; Erlenkotter, 1978; 
Van Roy and Erlenkotter, 1980). This means that most (perhaps 
all) deiivery-system-location problems can be solved by well 
known and reasonably simple existing techniques. 
2.2.3 Users-Attracting Systems 
A users-attracting system is the very opposite of a delivery 
system; it is the appropriate model for most meaningful urban 
service systems and it also raises unsolved problems and needs 
further research. The typical service mechanism of a users- 
attracting system is defined in the following way. 
Location and allocation are controlled by different 
decision makers, For our purposes, it can be assumed 
that location is controlled by a planner (usually a 
p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t y  o r  a g e n c y )  w h i l e  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  con- 
t r o l l e d  by u s e r s .  (Users a r e  n o t  s i n g l e  d e c i s i o n  maker s ,  
t h e y  a r e  a n  a g g r e g a t e  o f  p o s s i b l y  g o a l - c o n f l i c t i n g  
p e o p l e .  L e t  i t  b e  p r o v i s i o n a l l y  assumed,  however,  t h a t  
c o n f l i c t i n g  problems among u s e r s  c a n  b e  n e g l e c t e d ,  and  
" a v e r a g e "  u s e r s '  g o a l s  c a n  b e  d e f i n e d . )  
Users t r a v e l ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h e y  have  t o  g o  t o  t h e  f a c i l i t y  
l o c a t i o n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  be  s e r v e d .  T h i s  a l s o  means t h e y  
have  t o  pay f o r  t r a v e l i n g .  
While  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t s  a r e  c h a r g e d  t o  t h e  u s e r s  ( r e c a l l  
t h a t  t r a n s p o r t  costs a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  p a i d  i n  t e r m s  
o f  money) ,  costs f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  p a i d  
by t h e  p l a n n e r  o r  p u b l i c  d e c i s i o n  maker .  
T h r e e  good examples  o f  u s e r s  a t t r a c t i n g  s y s t e m s  a r e  s c h o o l s ,  
h o s p i t a l s ,  and  c u l t u r a l  and  r e c r e a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e s .  N e e d l e s s  t o  
s a y ,  e v e r y  k i n d  o f  s c h o o l  meets a l l  t h r e e  o f  t h e  above  d e f i n i -  
t i o n s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  f i r s t  d e f i n i t i o n  n e e d s  some c a r e  when it is  
a p p l i e d  t o  p r i m a r y  s c h o o l s ,  s i n c e  it i s  n o t  a l w a y s  c l e a r  who a r e  t h e  
u s e r s  and  what  g o a l s  t h e y  are p u r s u i n g .  I n  t h e  a u t h o r ' s  o p i n i o n ,  
c h i l d r e n  a r e  t h e  u s e r s ;  b u t  it is w e l l . k n o w n  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  d o  n o t  
l i k e  t o  g o  t o  s c h o o l ,  w h i l e  p u b l i c  e d u c a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  f o r c e  
them t o  go .  T h i s  i s  a  t y p i c a l  c o n f l i c t i n g - g o a l s  problem.  I n  
some o t h e r  p e o p l e ' s  o p i n i o n  p a r e n t s  a r e  t h e  u s e r s ,  and  i n  t h i s  
c a s e  a  u s e r - p l a n n e r  g e n e r a l  ag reemen t  i s  more l i k e l y  t o  b e  f o u n d .  
With t h e  o n l y  e x c e p t i o n s  o f  emergency ambulance s y s t e m s  and  
home h e a l t h  care d e l i v e r y  s y s t e m s ,  a l l  h e a l t h  c a r e  f a c i l i t i e s  
meet t h e  t h r e e  d e f i n i t i o n s  g i v e n  above .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  h e a l t h  c a r e  
s y s t e m  p o s e s  new mode l ing  p rob lems ,  s i n c e  i t  e x h i b i t s  a  m u l t i -  
l e v e l  s t r u c t u r e  as f a r  a s  t h e  p a t i e n t - - o r  u s e r - - i s  c o n c e r n e d .  
A t y p i c a l  p a t i e n t  h i s t o r y  c o u l d  b e  t h e  p r o g r e s s i o n  from a  day-  
h o s p i t a l  f o r  a  check-up t o  a  s p e c i a l i z e d  h o s p i t a l  where t h e  
p a t i e n t  w a s  found  t o  have  c a n c e r ,  t h e n  t o  a s p e c i a l i z e d  s u r g i c a l  
h o s p i t a l  where he  was o p e r a t e d  o n ,  a f t e r  which h e  was s e n t  t o  a 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  c e n t e r  u n t i l  f u l l  r e c o v e r y .  I f  he  i s  l u c k y  
enough,  h e  w i l l  f i n d  a l l  f a c i l i t i e s  h e  n e e d s  i n  t h e  same l o c a -  
t i o n s .  But  t h i s  i s  u n l i k e l y ,  s i n c e ,  w h i l e  g e n e r a l  p u r p o s e  
f a c i l i t i e s  ( e . g . ,  d a y - h o s p i t a l s )  may be f a i r l y  s c a t t e r e d ,  
s p e c i a l i z e d  o r  i n f r e q u e n t  t r e a t m e n t s  t e n d  t o  be c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  
few l o c a t i o n s  ( e . g . ,  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  c e n t e r s ) .  The h e a l t h  c a r e  
f a c i l i t i e s  o p t i m a l  l o c a t i o n  must  t a k e  t h i s  m u l t i l e v e l  s t r u c t u r e  
and b e h a v i o r  i n t o  a c c o u n t ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  e v a l u a t e  n o t  o n l y  
a c c e s s i b i l i t y  from demand l o c a t i o n s  t o  f a c i l i t y  l o c a t i o n s ,  - b u t  
a l s o  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  w i t h i n  f a c i l i t i e s  b e l o n g i n g  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
l e v e l s .  
P u b l i c  l i b r a r i e s ,  t h e a t e r s ,  and swimming p o o l s  a r e  s e v e r a l  
examples o f  c u l t u r a l  and r e c r e a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e s  where t h e  t r a v e l  
p a t t e r n  r e s u l t i n g  from u s e r s '  b e h a v i o r  i s  u s u a l l y  f a r  from a  
p lanned one.  D i f f e r e n t  t a s t e s  may l e a d  t o  c h o i c e s  which d i s a g r e e  
w i t h  d i s t a n c e  minimizing.  Unl ike  t h e  d e l i v e r y  sys tems ,  i n  t h e  
u s e r s - a t t r a c t i n g  sys tems  e v e r y  p o s s i b l e  c o m p l i c a t i o n  c a n  a r i s e  
(and u s u a l l y  d o e s ) .  L o c a t i o n  g o a l s  (or  p l a n n e r  g o a l s )  and 
a l l o c a t i o n  g o a l s  (or  u s e r  g o a l s )  may b e  d i f f e r e n t  and c o n f l i c t i n g ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  p u b l i c  f a c i l i t y  a s sumpt ion  u s u a l l y  i m p l i e s  t h e y  a r e  
n o t .  A model f o r  u s e r s '  b e h a v i o r  i s  needed,  s i n c e  u s u a l l y  s u c h  
s i m p l e  r u l e s  a s  n e a r e s t - f a c i l i t y  a l l o c a t i o n  a r e  u n r e a l i s t i c  and 
do  n o t  f i t  t h e  a c t u a l  b e h a v i o r .  A c c e s s i b i l i t y  and c o n g e s t i o n  
s e n s i t i v e n e s s  may a l s o  b e  r e q u i r e d ,  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  r e c r e a t i o n -  
a l  s e r v i c e s .  The t y p i c a l  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t r a n s p o r t  f l o w s  i n  a  u s e r s -  
a t t r a c t i n g  sys tem i s  shown i n  F i g u r e  3 .  
I t  may b e  u s e f u l  t o  s a y  t h a t  models f o r  u s e r s - a t t r a c t i n g  
sys tems a r e  h a r d l y  found i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  r e s e a r c h  (OR)  and 
management s c i e n c e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  u n l e s s  f o r  s p e c i a l  c a s e s ,  which 
c a n  be  (or  a r e  f o r c e d  t o  b e )  r educed  t o  t h e  u s u a l  p l a n t - l o c a t i o n  
form. On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e  problem of  model ing  l o c a t i o n  
sys tems  based  on a c t u a l  u s e r s '  b e h a v i o r  a p p e a r s  i n  most  r e g i o n a l  
s c i e n c e  and u rban  geography l i t e r a t u r e  (Lowry, 1964; H a r r i s ,  1964; 
Huff ,  1964 and 1966; Lakshmanan and Hansen, 1965; Wilson,  1970, 
1974, and 1976; Coelho and Wilson,  1976 and 1977; L e o n a r d i ,  1978 
and 1979a; H a r r i s  and Wilson,  1 9 7 8 ) .  Most o f  t h e s e  models a r e  
based on t h e  s o - c a l l e d  g r a v i t y ,  or  s p a t i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n s  assump- 
t i o n ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  which t h e  number of  t r i p s  between demand and 
f a c i l i t y  l o c a t i o n s  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  a  smooth d e c r e a s i n g  func-  
t i o n  o f  d i s t a n c e  or  t r a v e l  c o s t  ( o t h e r  imposed c o n s t r a i n t s  b e i n g  
m e t ) .  
service facilities 
demand locations 
trips from demand locations to facilities 
Figure 3. Typical users-attracting system flow pattern. 
Although the above models are based on more general and 
sensible physical assumptions, as compared to the usual OR 
"plant-location" models, the development of mathematical tools 
and algorithms have not been as good as in the OR field. This 
is an area where some unsolved problems can still be found, and 
further research is needed. 
2.3 The Users' Behavior 
2 , 3 . 1  Introduction 
The purpose of Section 2.3 is to introduce some specific 
assumptions and models for users' trip-making and facility-choosing 
behavior. Therefore, from now on reference will be made only to 
the users-attracting systems. Here again it can be said that, 
although each kind of service is associated with a different 
user's behavior, many common features in the models and techni- 
ques can be found. The main issues leading towards some unifying 
results can he summarized into three groups. 
The problem of relating users' choices to some optimizing 
behavior is the first main issue. Although a completely random- 
choice behavior is possible, in most meaningful cases some 
regularities can be found, which lead to the assumption that 
users consistently choose locations with some overall optimiza- 
tion criterion. Gravity and spatial interaction models play an 
important role in this field, since they have both good empirical 
testing and optimization interpretations. 
The second issue is the problem of defining a suitable 
general form for an accessibility-sensitive demand mechanism. 
This is a problem seldom found in both OR and regional science 
literature. It is therefore a good topic for further research, 
and a most promising one, since many public services exhibit 
accessibility-sensitivs demand. 
The third problem is that of defining a suitable, general 
form for a congestion-sensitive demand mechanism. Of course, 
congestion mechanisms are the main subject of queuing theory. 
But the queuing theory approach is micro and is therefore 
unlikely to be useful to solve problems of realistic size (that 
is, with many service locations). Some simpler models are there- 
fore needed, perhaps based on more aggregate assumptions and 
variables than queuing models. 
In the following sub-sections a general, nontechnical 
description of ways to solve the above problems is given, and 
some possible further generalizations are suggested. 
2 . 3 . 2  Planned  V e r s u s  UnpZanned A Z  l o c a t i o n  
Although it sounds like a contradiction (and in the opinion 
of the author it is, to some extent), it is worth considering 
the case of users-attracting systems where allocation is centrally 
planned, although the users pay for travel costs. This is not 
necessarily a strong inconsistency with the public nature of the 
services to be located. If, for instance, users have a general 
tendency to minimize travel costs, but may also wish to trade 
off other costs or benefits (like congestion or quality of 
service), while a public decision maker strictly minimizes 
travel cost, it cannot be said that he is really inconsistent 
with users1 goals. He is just narrow-minded and uninformed on 
some details of the users1 preferences, although he is aware of 
some of their main and simplest tendencies (like travel cost 
minimizing), Since he is unable to predict what users will do 
when facilities will be provided, he just imposes on them a 
behavior according to his simplified version of their own goals. 
This approach is somewhat justified (although not necessarily 
to be agreed with) when there is no difference between users and 
public decision makers, in either goals or costs to be paid, or 
when the public decision maker has enough normative power to 
effectively impose the allocation rule. The US-Italian primary 
school location-allocation examples are relevant again here. 
As already stated, there is no difference between such 
problems and classical plant-location problems, as far as mathe- 
matical models and solution algorithms are concerned. The 
induced users1 behavior follows the simple nearest-facility 
allocation rule, depicted in Figure 4. 
service facilities 
demand locations 
,-* trips from demand locations to nearest facilities 
Figure 4. Typical users' flow pattern for planned-allocation 
users-attracting systems. 
Let it now be assumed that at least one of the two justifi- 
cations to the approach of the decision maker no longer holds 
true, or is likely to be unfair. It may happen, for instance, 
that trade-offs between travel costs and other users' costs and 
benefits are too relevant to be neglected. Obvious examples are 
health care (non-emergency) services, most kinds of schools, and 
cultural and recreational facilities. It may also happen that 
the public planner has no real normative control on the way users 
allocate themselves to facilities. He is just hoping they will 
go to the nearest facilities, and makes his plan accordingly. 
In this case, allocation should not be referred to as "planned". 
What the public decision maker is actually doing is using a bad, 
unreliable users' behavior model. 
Many more examples could be given, which regrettably raise 
complicated social and political issues, outside the scope of 
this paper. Let it be assumed, therefore, that there are 
enough intuitive reasons to focus our interest on location 
systems where allocation is left to the users' unplanned 
behavior. These systems will be referred to as "unplanned 
allocation systems". 
Without much loss of generality, let it also be assumed that, 
other things being equal, users tend to minimize travel cost. 
It then follows that possible deviations from this tendency may 
result if some of the "other things" are not perfectly "equal". 
If the overall result of such a process is examined, one can 
expect to find a frequency of users' trips that decreases with the 
cost of traveling from demand location to facilities. The usual 
trip pattern resulting from this behavior looks like the one 
shown in Figure 5. That is, although most trips are to the 
nearest facility, a sizeable amount are to a further facility. 
The pattern shown in Figure 5 is an intermediate one between two 
possible extremes: 
-- All flows go to the nearest facilities, which then reduces 
to the already discussed planned-allocation problem 
-- Flows are evenly split among facilities, which is 
equivalent to a users' behavior totally insensitive to 
travel cost 
f a c i l i t i e s  
0 demands 
t r i p s  f r o m  demand l o c a t i o n s  
t o  f a c i l i t i e s  
Figure 5. Typical users' flow pattern for unplanned-allocation 
users-attracting system. 
2 . 3 , 3  Spatial-Interaction-Based AIIocation Models 
This section focuses on possible useful ways to handle the 
unplanned-allocation case discussed in Section 2.3.1. Provided 
users are assumed to have different tastes, value judgments, 
and cost-benefit evaluations for each facility, their behavior 
can be modeled by using one of the following two approaches. 
1. The disaggregate approach, where a complete list of all 
users in each location is kept, and the utility functions 
(or at least the preference ordering relations) on 
alternative facilities are defined for each user in the 
list. This approach has been recently proposed by 
Hanjoul (1 980). 
2. The aggregate approach, which is useful when the list of 
users becomes very large and it is impractical to keep 
track of every user and hopeless to define so many 
preference orders. Some general regularities in 
aggregate behavior are usually found, when the overall 
result of superimposing all these different preference 
orders is observed. The frequency of choice usually 
decreases with travel costs. If needed, or if available 
data make it possible, other relevant explanatory 
variables can be introduced. Such observed data can be 
plotted and fitted with some curve (and a good fit is 
usually found). 
It is obvious that the first approach can be used only when 
the number of different users, or preference orders, in the list 
is small. It is, however, interesting when micro-behavior 
exploration is the main concern. But for operational purposes 
the aggregate approach seems better, when users are so many they 
cannot be listed one by one.(This is, by the way, the usual case 
with real public facilities.) 
Approach 2 gives rise to what are usually referred to as 
"gravity", or "spatial-interaction" models. In loose terms 
(more technical definitions will be given in later sections), 
the main feature of a spatial-interaction model is to replace 
the very sharp assumption of travel-cost minimizing with the 
smoother assumption of space-discount behavior. While the 
travel-cost-minimizing user places infinite value on the nearest 
facility, the space-discounting user ranks in distance-decreasing 
order all facilities, the distance-decrease shape being given by 
a curve similar to those in Figure 6. Moreover, space-discounting 
users are assumed to be stochastic, and to choose facilities with 
probabilities proportional to the space-discount factor (other 
possible constraints being met). Stochastic behavior here is 
merely a model of our ignorance, since detailed information on 
each user has been lost after the aggregation process*. 
*A microeconoaiic stochastic behavior miqht also be introduced, 
if each user is assuned to have a probability distribution on 
utilities assiqned to each facility. This is basically what 
random utility theory is. But luckily enough random-utility 
based models are indistinguishable from gravity models at the 
macro level. They are actually a possible alternative inter- 
pretation of the same models, rather than new ones. 
4 u p p e r  l i m i t :  
r a n d o m  c h o i c e  
a l l o c a t i o n  r u l e  
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Figure 6. General shape for a family of space-discount functions. 
I 
A useful property of the family of curves shown in Figure 6 
is that it includes the nearest-facility allocation rule as a 
special case (curve 1). It also includes the opposite limiting 
case, that is, the random (distance or travel cost independent) 
allocation rule (horizontal line 4). In real problems, however, 
cases will be found between these two extremes: 2 and 3. 
2 s t r o n g  s p a c e  
d i s c o u n t  e f f e c L  
Although gravity or spatial-interaction models were first 
developed empirically, many alternative theoretical justifica- 
tions for them have been proposed in the last 10 years, so that 
what once seemed to be slightly more than a rule-of-thumb model 
has become a topic worthy of consideration by theoretical econo- 
mists and geographers, mathematicians, and statisticians, besides 
, regional scientists. Such theoretical works range from the 
classical entropy maximizing approach (Wilson, 1970), which is 
an aggregate one, to disaggregate stochastic-choice models, 
among which the logit model is the best known (McFadden, 1973, 
1974), to models that derive macroeconomic interpretations by 
aggregating random-choice models, like in the consumer surplus 
maximizing approach (Neuburger, 1971; Williams, 1977; Coelho 
and Williams, 1978; Coelho and Wilson, 1976) or in the 
accessibility maximizing approach (Leonardi, 1973, 1975, 1978; 
Williams and Senior, 1978). 
3 weak s p a c e  
d i s c o u n t  e f f e c ,  
* d 
In spite of the seemingly strong differences among these 
approaches, it is surprising how they all give rise to the same 
models, as far as their mathematical form is concerned. This is 
not really surprising, if one considers the fact that the logit 
model, which is supposed to have definite roots in random 
utility theory (being a typical "micro" model), is merely a 
multinomial logistic distribution. On the other hand, the 
entropy maximizing approach, which has been developed in statis- 
tical mechanics (and makes no assumptions on the microscopic 
behavior of the system under study, but just poses some weak 
constraints at the aggregate level) gives rise to the same 
multinominal logistic distribution. (The Bolzmann probability 
distribution used in thermodynamics and the Fermi-Dirac distri- 
bution of quantum mechanics are nothing but special forms of 
logit models). 
Besides the theoretical significance of this genera! consis- 
tency between different interpretations, it is operationally 
comfortable to know that one has to work with just one mathematical 
formulation. Although the subject will be treated in more detail 
in later sections, it is worth at this point to give the general 
form for a spatial interaction model, which is as follows: 
where 
itj are'subscripts labeling the locations of demand 
and facilities, respectively 
Gi is the total demand for service generated in i per unit time 
W is a measure of attractiveness of facility in j j 
'i j is the total cost associated with a displacement from i to j, measured in appropriate units 
f(.) is a space discount function, of the kind 
discussed above 
'i j is the number of customers living in location i and using the facility loca- 
tion j 
The space-discount function is often assumed to have some special 
form, like a negative exponential, or a negative power function, 
but none of these assumptions is needed to analyze the general 
structure of a spatial-interaction model. On the contrary, terms 
like "generation" and "attractiveness" need a better definition, 
since they are related to the problems of modeling sensitiveness 
of demand both to travel cost or accessibility and to congestion 
or overcrowding of facilities. 
2 . 3 . 4  A c c e s s i b i  Z i t y  - S e n s i t i v e  Demand 
Most existing public facility location models assume both 
allocation of customers to the nearest facility and insensitive- 
ness of demand to accessibility to the service. But, as already 
discussed in the introductory sections, this assumption is not 
appropriate for many services, where the total demand cannot be 
estimated independently of the size and location of facilities. 
In other words, demand is induced by the provision of the service, 
and usually the easier facilities can be reached, the higher will 
be the demand. In loose economic terms, it may be said that 
travel cost acts as a price to be paid in order to use the 
service, and total demand is nonincreasing with this cost. 
Although the sensitive-demand problem has been stated in market- 
like terms, it is in no way related with market economies rather 
than planned economies. Travel costs must be paid everywhere, 
since they depend on the existence of space distances, and are 
not necessarily measured in terms of money. (In most urban 
settlenents travel time is usually the best measure of travel 
cost.) 
In order to define a general structure for an accessibility- 
sensitive-demand model, some definite measures of accessibility 
have to be introduced. The three main possibilities are listed 
below. 
a. Accessibility is measured by means of either the nearest 
facility travel cost or the arithmetic mean of travel 
costs to all facilities. Both measures tacitly assume 
that customers agree on evaluating distances according 
to a minimum distance, or an arithmetic mean basis. 
These assumptions are usually inconsistent with a general 
spatial-interaction behavior. 
b. Accessibility is a measure of users' benefit consistent 
with a spatial-interaction behavior. Since according 
to most spatial interaction data, users seem to apply a 
definite distance-decreasing discount factor on facil- 
ities, the most natural measure of accessibility seems 
to be a sum of the capacity (or attractiveness) of all 
service facilities, each one discounted with its own 
space discount factor. Such a measure is closely related 
to early concepts of social physics and regional analysis 
(like potentials and related concepts). (See Steward, 1948; 
and Vickerman, 1974 for a review.) In its modern form 
it has been introduced by Hansen (1959), and developed 
by Ingram (1971), Neibull (1971), Leonardi (1976), 
Smith (1976),  avids son (1977), and Sheppard (1979). Its 
general form is: 
A is the measure of accessibility to the 
service from a given demand location 
W is a weight measuring attractiveness of j 
facility in j; no generality is lost if the 
W. are assumed to be normalized, i.e.: 
I 
C is the cost of traveling from the demand loca- 
l tion to the facility in j 
f(-) is a space-discount function 
c. Accessibility is measured by an "average" travel cost, 
where the averaging operator is consistent with a 
spatial-interaction behavior. Since users perceive 
distance by means of a space discount function, which is 
averaged to build an accessibility measure (see b above), 
it is natural to obtain a measure of "average" travel 
cost by applying the inverse of the space-discount 
function to accessibility. That is 
where 
- 
C is the average travel cost from a given demand 
location having accessibility A defined by (2) 
F' ( *  ) is the inverse function of f ( ) 
Average travel cost as computed by (3) is the only possible 
average ensuring consistency in problems of aggregating and 
disaggregating spatial-choice models. It has been discussed in 
depth by many authors (usually for special functional forms), 
among them Wilson (1 974) , Williams (1 977) , and Leonardi (1 979b) . 
Two general forms are possible for an accessibility- 
sensitive-demand generation model depending on whether accessi- 
bility is measured by some actual "accessibility" index, like 
(2), or by some measure of "average" (including minimum distance) 
cost. The first general form is an accessibiZity-increasing 
demand curve, like the one shown in Figure 7. In general, 
demand G will increase up to a maximum value P, corresponding to 
the maximum value of A, which is reached when all travel costs 
are zero (that is, space disappears). Furthermore, generated 
- 
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demand  
Figure 7. An accessibility-increasing demand curve. 
P 
p o t e n t i a l  
d e m a n d  
demand G will be bounded from above by a maximum potential 
demand P, which is always finite (even though possibly very large) 
if the total population living in the demand location is finite. 
/ 
- -- 
/ H a n s e n  
The second general form for an accessibility-sensitive- 
demand model is an average-cost-decreasing demand curve, like 
the one shown in Figure 8. In general, demand G will reach its 
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0  f ( 0 )  
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Figure 8. An average-cost-decreasing demand curve. 
(physically feasible) maximum P for zero cost, and then decrease 
as travel cost increases. The upper bound P has the same mean- 
ing as before. 
Of course there is no real difference between the two 
formulations given above, since the two demand curves can be 
mapped one on the other. The choice of the best formulation is 
a matter of convenience. 
Perhaps it is also worth mentioning that, just as nearest- 
facility travel cost is included in "average costs" many special 
measures are incorporated in "accessibility measures" as defined 
by (2), including the widely used "coverage-based" accessibility 
measure. This measure is defined as the number (or the total 
capacity, or any measure proportional to them) of facilities 
which can be reached within a given maximum travel-cost range. 
This is a special case of (2), where f(*) is a step function 
like the one shown in Figure 9. 
However, a step function is not the best one to be used 
for elastic-demand models, since the way it evaluates distance 
is typical of emergency services, which usually (and hopegully) 
have inelastic demand. 
1 
C t r a v e l  
- 
0 C m a x i m u m  c o s t  
r a n g e  
Figure 9. Step space discount function for "coverage" acces- 
sibility measures. 
2 . 3 . 5  C o n g e s t i o n - S e n s i t i v e  Demand 
As with accessibility-sensitive demand, most facility loca- 
tion models ignore possible demand sensitiveness to congestion. 
Indeed, the best-known models in the literature on static optimal 
location modeling are "uncapacitated", which means they assume a 
total capacity that always matches total demand. 
Just like travel cost, congestion is a cost that all custom- 
ers have to pay (usually in non-monetary units) in order to be 
served, no matter what economic system rules their country. 
Although congestion costs are not as unavoidable as travel costs 
since there is no real physical bound on building new facilities, 
capacity expansion usually does not solve the problem. This is 
true mainly when the accessibility-sensitive-demand mechanism is 
also at work, since increase in capacity increases accessibility, 
which in turn generates new demand. The joint effect of both 
mechanisms may therefore result in increased congestion because 
we increased capacity. This frequently happens with many ser- 
vices, not necessarily of a recreational nature, like non- 
emergency health care facilities. It always happens when capac- 
ity expansion is decided locally, without an overall look at 
the whole system of locations. 
The simplest congestion-sensitive-demand model is a linear 
feedback signal that is given by the difference between total 
capacity and attracted demand, which changes the value of the 
attractiveness weights for each facility. (It is assumed that 
attracted demand may never be greater than total capacity, by 
definition.) The resulting weights give a new value for acces- 
sibilities, which in turn generate different values for total 
demand, and so on, over and over, until some equilibrium (if any) 
is reached. This two-step mechanism can be given the following, 
simple mathematical formulation. 
1. Congestion-sensitive attractiveness weights are eval- 
uated according to the formula 
where: 
is the capacity of facility in location j 
D is the total demand attracted in location j  j  
wi ( - )  is the (normalized) attractiveness weight 
J 
for facility in location j ;  it is a function 
of the vector X - D = { x j  - D.) of differ- 
3 
ences between total capacity and attracted 
demand. 
2. The new accessibility resulting from'the new weights 
is evaluated, according to ( 2 ) .  
where 
A(-) is the accessibility measure, expressed as 
a function of the differences between 
capacity and demand 
Although accessibility has been used in the above formula- 
tion, of course a similar formulation can be given in terms of 
average travel cost. 
.?. 3 .6  O v e r a t 2  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  A c c e s s i b i  l i t y - C o n g e s t i o n -  
S e n s i t i v e  A l l o c a t i o n  S y s t e m  
Now that all its subsystems have been defined the overall 
allocation system can be assembled. Its general structure is 
shown in Figure 10. 
The contents and meaning of each subsystem need no further 
explanation, since they have been described in detail in the 
preceeding sections. The flows 1ir:king the subsystems are worth 
some explanation, however, Taken as a whole, the system receives 
two inputs, the potential demand P and the capacity X, and gives 
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v e c t o r  
g e n e r a t e d  
A  demand 
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Figure  1 0 .  An overview of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among s t a t i c  f a c i l i t y -  
l o c a t i o n  models. 
the allocation matrix S as an output. While the input P is 
totally exogenous, possibly given by some population forecast 
model, the input X is a control vector, whose choice determines 
size and location of facilities. The output S will be subject 
to evaluation in the decision process, together with the control 
vector X, since benefits and costs will depend on them. Two 
main feed-back loops can be seen in the inner flows. 
The main loop links demand generation, allocation, and 
congestion evaluation. The'demand generation subsystem 
(or accessibility-sensitive-demand model), receives an 
accessibility estimate A, generates a demand G and sends 
it as an input to the allocation subsystem. This sub- 
system (using also the current estimate of attractive- 
ness W) allocates the generated demand G to facilities, 
by means of a general spatial-interaction model, and 
evaluates the total demand D attracted by each facility. 
The attracted demand evaluation D is sent to the 
congestion-sensitive subsystem, which compares it with 
capacity X, evaluates new weights W and new accessi- 
bilities A. Finally, the new accessibility evaluation 
is sent back again to the accessibility sensitive 
demand subsystem, and a new cycle is started. 
The smaller loop links the allocation and the conges- 
tion evaluation. This is a simple loop, nested within 
the main one, with the only purpose of updating the 
attractiveness vector W, to be used in the allocation 
model, and the attracted demand vector D, to be used in 
the evaluation of new congestion-sensitive weights. 
A warning will conclude this section. The system has been 
described in pseudo-dynamic terms, but its use for dynamic 
simulation is not suggested. Although the way it works is better 
understood in dynamic terms, the general model of Figure 10 is 
more likely to give good steady-state solutions, rather than the 
actual transient behavior of an allocation system. This is 
mainly due to two reasons. The first is that most of the models 
used, especially the allocation (spatial interaction) model, are 
equilibrium models. Usually the transient dynamic behavior of a 
spatial interaction pattern does not fit a gravity model, and 
it takes some nonnegligible time to settle down (provided no 
further noise is introduced). The second reason is that usually 
real spatial interaction systems have time lags. The reaction 
of demand to changes in accessibility and in congestion cannot 
be immediate, nor can demand be assumed to receive perfect infor- 
mation on all the changes in every location as soon as these 
changes take place. 
In spite of this, a rough dynamic use of the model is possi- 
ble when we are interested in long term changes rather than in 
transient behavior. In other words, if information on system 
changes is sampled at time intervals at least as long as the 
average settling-down time, and if significant input changes can 
be reasonably assumed to take place only at the sampling times, 
then just a sequence of equilibrium states will be observed. 
This.kind of analysis is closer to comparative statics, rather 
than dynamics. In any event, the construction of a satisfactory 
dynamic spatial-interaction framework is not an aim of this 
paper. [Some attempts in this direction can be found in Harris 
and Wilson (1978), Bertuglia and Leonardi (1979), and Wilson 
(1979). I 
2.4 Goals and Tools for Service Location Planning 
2.4.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n  
While the previous sections have been mainly devoted to the 
description of the system's behavior, the following sections will 
review the problem of controlling the location-allocation system 
in some optimal way. This means answering three questions. 
1. Which goals are relevant for a service location planning 
decision? 
2. Which variables can be used to control the systems, and 
under what constraints? 
3. What is the general form of models corresponding to 
different goal-control variable combinations? 
As already stated in the general introduction, no attempt 
will be made here to go deeply into such complicated problems 
as the foundations of welfare theory, public goods theory, equity 
theory, and so on. The existing location models have usually 
simple objective functions and constraints, and no large theoret- 
ical apparatus is needed to interpret and justify them. However, 
some common features in them are general enough to deserve a 
special discussion. 
Most of these general problems have been already met in the 
introductory sections: the equity-efficiency trade-off problem, 
which is easily generalized to multi-objective conflicting 
problems; the location-allocation consistency problem; and the 
introduction of actual users' behavior in location models. 
2.4.2 The Equity-Efficiency Trade-off ProbZern 
A vast literature can be found on the conflict between 
equity and efficiency in location problems (see Alperovich, 1972; 
McGrew and Monroe, 1975; McAllister, 1976; Morrill and Symons, 
1977; Bigman and ReVelle, 1978, 1979; and Lea, 1979). Although 
discussions on the exact definition of terms like "equity", 
"welfare", and "efficiency" tends to be endless, the problem 
behind these terms is quite simple. Apart from technical details, 
all measures of equity or welfare used in location problems are 
measures of nearness, ease of access, and fair distribution of 
service to users. This is true for the transport-cost minimiza- 
tion criterion used in most models (although some criticism can 
be raised against it as far as-fair distribution is concerned), 
for the maximum coverage criterion used in many models for the 
location of emergency services, and for the consumer-surplus 
maximizing models used in locating urban activities with spatial 
interactions. 
Maximization of access and equitable distribution of service 
capacity to the customers usually implies the opening of many 
dispersed small facilities. On the other hand, efficiency is 
usually measured in terms of the costs to be paid to establish 
and operate the facilities. Since both costs usually exhibit 
economies of scale, maximization of efficiency often implies 
concentration of service in few large facilities. In loose 
terms, an optimal location model might be generally defined as a 
method to find a trade-off between these two conflicting goals. 
It is also worth noting that the existence of these two conflic- 
ting goals is the only reason location models have some meaning 
and usefulness. Locational decisions taken according to only 
one goal would lead to ridiculous and unrealistic results. 
From the technical standpoint, there are three ways to 
introduce equity-efficiency goals in location problems, giving 
rise to three different broad families of models: 
Models where some user's benefit (cost) is maximized 
(minimized), subject to a budget constraint on total 
cost to establish and run the facilities. This is 
usually considered as the typical formulation for a 
public facility location problem, since public author- 
ities, who are assumed to pay for the costs, are 
supposed to not use their budget for profit-making. 
The above general definition of public facility location 
problems is found in ReVelle et al. (1970), ReVelle and 
Rojeski (1970), Swain (1974), and Hansen and Kaufman 
(1976). 
Models where some efficiency measure is maximized, sub- 
ject to a constraint on the minimum users' benefit 
requirement. Typical examples are the so-called set- 
covering problems, which are also widely used to locate 
some public facilities (mainly emergency services). In 
its simplest form, a set-covering location problem 
minimizes the number of facilities to be located (the 
efficiency goal) subject to the requirement that each 
demand location has at least one facility within a given 
maximum range of travel time (the equity constraints). 
This formulation has been widely used for locating 
emergency services with deliveries from facilities to 
demand locations, like fire stations and ambulance 
systems (Toregas et a1.1971; ReVelle et al. 1976; 
Plane and Hendrick, 1977). 
Models where the objective function is the difference 
between a measure of users' benefit and public authority 
costs in order to establish and run facilities without 
any constraints. Since the two terms are usually 
measured in different units, at least one of them 
(usually the cost term) must be weighted with a scaling 
factor, reflecting the judgment of the decision maker 
(or decision makers) on their relative importance. 
Although this formulation is usually considered as more 
suited to private sector location problems, it has also 
been used to analyze trade-offs between benefits and 
costs in public facility location problems (possibly 
with a sensitivity analysis on the scaling factor). 
This "bi-objective" approach is discussed in Bigman and 
ReVelle (1 979) and Erlenkotter (1 977) . 
Although these three formulations seem rooted on quite 
different public welfare conceptions, they share many common 
formal features, to such an extent that they actually can be 
reduced to the same mathematical form and solved with the same 
algorithms. If, for instance, a Lagrangean relaxation is 
introduced for the constraints of the first two types of models, 
both can be replaced by a model of the third type, the Lagrange 
multiplier acting as a scaling factor. This is even more 
sensible than the original formulations, since it is usually 
hard, for a public decision maker to assess a priori the values 
for a total budget or a minimum travel-time requirement, so that 
a trade-off sensitivity analysis has to be made anyway. 
Other unifying properties can be found in the various ways 
of measuring travel cost and accessibility to the users. ~lthough 
the minimum distance requirement seems very different from travel 
cost minimization, it has been shown (Church and ReVelle, 1976) 
that the minimum distance requirement is a special case of travel- 
cost minimization, provided an infinite cost is placed on dis- 
placements outside of the required range. 
2.4. 3 The ~ocation-AZZocation Consistency ProbZem 
It has been stated in Section 2 that location and allocation 
may be controlled by different decision makers. For the case of 
users' attracting systems, allocation is always left to the users, 
while location and size of facilities are decided by a public 
authority. 
If the simplifying assumption is introduced that users 
always choose the nearest facility, the resulting location models 
belong to the class of plant-location problems fcund in operations 
research and management science literature. The recent develop- 
ment of tremendously powerful dual-based algorithms (Bilde and 
Krarup, 1977; Erlenkotter, 1978; Van Roy and Erlenkotter, 1980; 
Wolsey, 1980) makes it hard to imagine any further improvement 
on theory and computation for these problems. 
If, on the other hand, users are allocated to facilities 
according to a general spatial-interaction-based allocation 
model of the form proposed in Section 2.3, then many new 
theoretical and computational problems arise. 
The general structure of a (possibly dynamic) location 
model based on a spatial-interaction allocation rule is shown 
in Figure 1 1 .  
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Figure 1 1 .  General form of a dynamic location-allocation model. 
The variables and symbols introduced in the diagram of 
Figure 1 1  are defined as follows: 
P = {pi) is a vector whose components are 
the potential demands in each 
demand location i 
is a vector whose components are 
the unit time potential demand 
increments in each demand location i 
is a vector whose components are 
the existing service capacities in 
each service location j 
is a vector whose components are 
the new capacities in each service 
location j, after the location 
decision has taken place 
is the allocation matrix, i.e., a 
matrix whose elements are the flows 
of users between each demand-facility 
location pair (i, j ) 
is the allocation rule, as resulting 
from the general model shown in 
Figure 10 (Section 2.3.5) i .e., 
A (  , - 1  is a matrix function of the 
vectors of potential demand and 
service capacity, and the equation 
holds 
is the public authority-evaluated 
users' benefit, i.e., V(-,-,-) is 
a scalar function of the allocation 
matrix, of the potential demand 
vector and of the capacity vector 
is the cost paid by the public 
authority to change the capacity (by 
expansion or demolition), i.e., 
C ( 0 , ~ )  is a scalar function of the 
old and new capacity vectors 
a is a unit-time discount factor 
is the total discounted value for 
a decision process starting with 
potential denand P and capacity Y 
The general model of Figure 1 1  can be further specialized, 
depending on which one of the following assumptions holds. 
a. Both location and allocation are directly decided by 
the public authority; this often (but not necessarily) 
leads to a problem of the plant-location type. Of 
course, in this case no spatial-interaction behavior 
takes place, since it is inhibited by the public 
authority-imposed behavior. (Many school allocation 
policies work like this, although they are often subject 
to serious criticisms.) 
b. Allocation results from unplanned users' behavior, i.e., 
from a spatial interaction model. The users' behavior 
model is known to the public authority, who takes it 
into account in deciding the location and size of facil- 
ities. However, the benefit evaluation of the public 
authority is not necessarily related to some natural 
users' benefit function, nor does such a function need 
to exist. This is a case where possible conflicting 
problems may arise, both among users and between the 
users and the public authority. Of course, a spatial 
i n t e r a c t i o n  model i s  n o t  s u i t e d  t o  t a k e  c o n f l i c t s  i n t o  
accoun t ,  s i n c e  it i s  an agg rega t e  model where a l l  u s e r s  
a r e  averaged o f f .  The microscop ic  approach seems 
b e t t e r  f o r  t h i s  purpose  (see t h e  f i r s t  approach d i s -  
cussed  i n  S e c t i o n  2 .3 .2 ) ,  s i n c e  it can  keep t r a c k  o f  
each u s e r  ( o r  p o s s i b l y  of  each homogenous group of  
u s e r s ,  i f  such a  grouping can be  d e f i n e d ) .  Th i s  ap- 
proach w i l l  n o t  be developed h e r e ,  b u t  it may w e l l  be 
one o f  t h e  t o p i c s  f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  on l o c a t i o n  models.  
c .  A s  i n  c a s e  b ,  a l l o c a t i o n  r e s u l t s  from unplanned u s e r s '  
behav io r ,  b u t ,  u n l i k e  c a s e  b ,  some agg rega t e  u s e r s '  
b e n e f i t  f u n c t i o n  is assumed t o  e x i s t .  More p r e c i s e l y ,  
a  s c a l a r  f u n c t i o n  W(S,P,X) can  be d e f i n e d ,  such t h a t  t h e  
problem: 
max W(S,P,X) 
i s  so lved  by 
where A ( P , X )  i s  t h e  u s e r s '  behavior-based a l l o c a t i o n  
r u l e .  S ince  u s e r s  behave a s  i f  they  w e r e  maximizing 
f u n c t i o n  ( 7 )  , it i s  n a t u r a l  t o  c a l l  W t h e  u s e r s  b e n e f i t  
f u n c t i o n .  I t  i s  a l s o  n a t u r a l ,  f o r  a  f a i r  p u b l i c  d e c i s i o n  
maker, t o  u se  t h e  same b e n e f i t  f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  eva lua-  
t i o n ,  t h a t  i s ,  t o  d e f i n e :  
When assumpt ions  (7), ( 8 ) ,  and ( 9 )  hold ,  no c o n f l i c t  
problem a r i s e s  between t h e  u s e r s  and t h e  p u b l i c  d e c i s i o n  
maker (PDM), t h a t  i s ,  t h e r e  i s  p e r f e c t  c o n s i s t e n c y  
between l o c a t i o n  and a l l o c a t i o n .  
The cases a ,  b, and c above g i v e  r i se  t o  t h e  fo l l owing  t h r e e  
f a m i l i e s  o f  mathemat ica l  programming problems. (For  s i m p l i c i t y ,  a  
static formulation is used, that is, we set a = 0): 
a. max {V[A(P,X) ,P,Xl - C(Y,X) 1 
A, X 
that is the PDM decides both on the allocation rule A 
and on the size of location of facilities X. 
b. max {V[A(P,X) ,P,Xl - C (Y,X) 1 
X 
that is, the PDM decides on the size and location of 
facilities X, while the allocation rule A is given and 
depends on users' behavior. 
c. max {max V[A, (PIX) ,P,Xl - c(Y,X) 1 
X A 
that is, the PDM decides on the size and location of 
facilities X, while the users decide on the allocation 
rule A. Moreover, both the PDM and the users agree on 
the way to evaluate benefits, since users choose, among 
all possible allocation rules, the one that maximizies 
V, while the PDM chooses, among all possible location 
patterns X, the one that maximizes V-C. 
2 . 4 .  4 S p a t i a  2 - I n t e r a c t i o n  Embedding L o c a t i o n  Models  
A noteworthy property of problem (12) is that, since the 
order with which the maximization operators are applied is 
immaterial, it can be rewritten as: 
max max Iv[A(P,x) ,PIXI - C(YIX) 1 
?. X 
and this is identical to (10). This means that, in the case of 
a perfect consistency between location and allocation goals the 
location problem is formally equivalent to a totally planned 
problem,although with a generally nonlinear objective function, 
Let two special, but still fairly general, assumptions now be 
introduced: 
a. The cost function is separable, that is, the total cost 
can be expressed as the sum of individual costs for each 
facility location: 
C(Y,X) = C  h. (x.) 
j 3 3  
where h . ( - )  is a (usually concave) scalar function. The 
3 
Y vector has been dropped, since it is constant, so that 
it is implicitly taken into account in the way the h.(-) 
3 
are built- 
b. The function V(S,P,X) can be expressed as 
where 
G = { C  Sij? is the vector of demands generated 
i in each i, 
D = l C  Sijl is the vector of demands attracted 
j in each j. 
The meaning of assumption (15) is that users, as well as the 
public decision maker, evaluate the allocation pattern S, the 
unsatisfied demand P-G (generated by the accessibility-sensitive 
mechanism), and the difference between capacity and attracted 
demand X-D (generated by the congestion-sensitive mechanism). If 
the following variables are introduced: 
- SiO = P - Gi - Pi - Z Sij the unsatisfied potential 
j demand in demand location i 
the unused capacity in facility 
j 
and the S matrix is augmented by one column {siO) and one row 
(S } (the element SO0 is not required), then an alternative 0 j 
representation of (1 5) is: 
It is also tacitly assumed that Y(-) is undefined for negative 
values, so that explicit nonnegativity constraints are not 
needed. 
If assumptions a and b are introduced in (13), the following 
mathematical programming problem is obtained: 
max {Y(s) - C h.(x.)) 
s,x j 3 I 
But the x variables can be eliminated by means of (l8), when j 
expressed in terms of the S variables. The general form of the 
resulting location-allocation problems is: 
max iY(S) - I h.(I Sij + S )I 
s j J i  0 j 
The above formulation includes most of the existing static 
facility location models. As a special case, if demand is 
inelastic (that is, SiO = 0 , SOj = 0), Y is linear, h.(*) are 
I 
made up of a fixed charge plus a linear cost, it reduces to the 
standard plant-location problem (provided nonnegativity restric- 
tions for S are introduced). If, however, Y is built in such a 
way that a spatial interaction model is induced for the optimal 
St then (19)-(20) includes most spatial-interaction based 
location-allocation models. 
The most useful property of such a formulation is that the 
spatial interaction model need not be introduced explicitly in 
the objective function or in the constraints. It is "embedded" 
by the optimization, and it holds for the optimal point, although 
it is not required to hold in the whole feasible region. The 
above two tricks, the embedding property and the widening of the 
feasible region, are the main reasons models of the (1 9) - (20) 
type are computationally attractive and successful. The embedd- 
ing approach has been first introduced by Coelho and Wilson 
(1976), and its close relationships with earlier works and 
problems were soon realized (Harris, 1964; Lakshmanan and Hansen, 
1965; Huff, 1966; Leonardi, 1973). Among its recent developments, 
the most promising ones for further research seem to be the 
extention to more complex systems of spatially interacting urban 
activities, (Wilson, 1978; Wilson and MacGill, 1979; Leonardi, 
1979a; MacGill and Wilson, 1979) with the possible inclusion of 
the transport network optimization (Boyce and Southworth, 1979; 
Boyce and LeBlanc, 1979). 
There is,however, a general criticism to be made to most of 
the works referred to above. While much theoretical insight has 
been gained by developing sound economical interpretations for 
the proposed spatial-interaction embedding objective functions 
(Neuburger, 1971; McFadden, 1973, 1974; Williams, 1977), most of 
the cost functions introduced in the models seem too simple and 
unrealistic; namely, they are usually simple linear functions, 
which of course cannot account for any economy-of-scale effect. 
In this respect, the traditional plant-location problems seem 
much more realistic, whether they introduce the scale effect by 
a non-smooth fixed-charge cost function, thus making it a com- 
binatorial programming problem, or they use a smooth concave 
cost f u n c t i o n .  The need i s  f e l t  t h e r e f o r e  t o  d e v e l o p  new models ,  
which s h a r e  b o t h  t h e  r e a l i s t i c  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  s p a t i a l - i n t e r a c t i o n  
embedding f u n c t i o n s ,  and t h e  r e a l i s t i c  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  concave  
( p o s s i b l y  non-smooth) cost f u n c t i o n s .  Some a t t e m p t s  have been 
made a l r e a d y  towards  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ,  by i n t r o d u c i n g  g e n e r a l  
concave  f u n c t i o n s ,  a s  i n  Jacobsen  and Kessel ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  or by u s i n g  
concave CES f u n c t i o n s ,  as i n  Leonard i  (1978, 1979a) ,  or f i x e d  
c h a r g e s  and c o m b i n a t o r i a l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  a s  i n  Hodgson ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  
Beaumont (1979) , and Leonard i  (1980) . T h i s  s t r a n d  of  r e s e a r c h  
seems a  m o s t  promis ing  one ,  a s  it promotes  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  among 
t h e  t w o  " s c h o o l s "  ( t h e  OR approach and t h e  s p a t i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  
a p p r o a c h ) ,  and it y i e l d s  more u s e f u l  models f o r  r e a l  p l a n n i n g  
problems. I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  a  l e a d i n g  t o p i c  f o r  t h e  l a t e r  s e c t i o n s  
of  t h i s  p a p e r ,  as w e l l  a s  fo r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  w i t h i n  t h e  P u b l i c  
F a c i l i t y  L o c a t i o n  Task. 
2 .4 .5  An Overview o f  t h e  R e Z a t i o n s h i p s  among S t a t i c  Faci  Z i t y -  
L o c a t i o n  Mode Zs 
I t  i s  wor th  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t o  s t o p  f o r  a  w h i l e ,  and t o  look  
back a t  what h a s  been d i s c u s s e d ,  b e f o r e  i n t r o d u c i n g  new t o p i c s .  
An o v e r a l l  p i c t u r e  o f  t h e  l i n k s  among assumpt ions  and models  i s  
shown i n  F i g u r e  12. B a s i c a l l y  t h r e e  b road  f a m i l i e s  o f  l o c a t i o n  
models have  been found ( t h e  round boxes a t  t h e  bot tom o f  t h e  
d iagram) : 
1. The p l a n t - l o c a t i o n  and r e l a t e d  l i n e a r  models.  Although 
t h e s e  a r e  borrowed from p r i v a t e  sector l o c a t i o n  problems,  
t h e y  have  been shown t o  be u s e f u l  f o r  some p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  
l o c a t i o n  problems a s  w e l l ,  l i k e  d e l i v e r y  sys tems  and  
emergency s e r v i c e s .  T h e i r  u s e  f o r  some u s e r s - a t t r a c t i n g  
sys tems  ( l i k e  p r imary  s c h o o l s )  h a s  a l s o  been found,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  soundness  o f  t h i s  approach  is n o t  war ran ted .  
2. The s p a t i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  embedding models .  These  have  
been deve loped  main ly  i n  t h e  f i e l d s  o f  r e g i o n a l  s c i e n c e  
and urban p l a n n i n g  and a r e  s t i l l  w a i t i n g  f o r  f u r t h e r  
development .  Although t h e i r  b e g i n n i n g  h a s  been i n  r e t a i l  
l o c a t i o n  problems ( H a r r i s ,  1964) ,  t h e y  seem t o  b e  a  
g e n e r a l  too l  t o  model a l l  u s e r s 1  a t t r a c t i n g  s y s t e m s ,  and 
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Figure 1 2 .  Summary of the  main r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among d i f f e r e n t  
loca t ion  models. 
their use for public facility location has probably more 
justifications than the original use in the retail sec- 
tor (since they are based on users' benefit maximizing, 
rather than on producer's profit maximizing). 
The models which do not belong either to 1 or 2. These 
models are a minority in the literature, and most of 
them were probably produced because of lack of insight 
into their economical justifications. There are, how- 
ever, few exceptions which deserve further attention, 
since they seem to pose some new meaningful and challeng- 
ing issues for future research. Some examples are the 
work of Hanjoul (1980) on the disaggregate analysis of 
users' utility functions and preference orders; of 
Hansen, Thisse, and Hanjoul (1979) on the introduction 
of pricing policies in locational decisions1 of Hansen 
and Thisse (1980) on the introduction of voting proce- 
dures in locational decisions; and of Stahl (1980) on 
locational patterns arising from imperfect users' infor- 
mation. 
Behind these three broad families of models, a hierarchy of 
assumptions (the square boxes in Figure 12) can be built, each 
path in the hierarchy leading to just one of the sets of models. 
. . 
The following five hierarchical levels can be seen. From top to 
bottom they are: 
Assumption on who decides location and size of facili- 
ties (By definition of public facility location, this 
decision maker can only be a public authority.) 
Assumption on who decides demand allocation to facili- 
ties (This is the very start of possible branchings, 
leading to different models.) 
Assumption on users' behavior in choosing facilities. 
6 Assumption on the existence of an overall users' bene- 
fit function 
Assumption on consistency between public authority 
goals and users' goals 
Different combinations of different answers to the questions 
posed in the assumptions above lead to different models, as 
shown in Figure 12. 
Another useful property for a unifying framework is revealed 
by the dotted-line path at the bottom of the diagram of Figure 12. 
All the existing models seem to include the linear plant-location 
model as a special limiting case. This property holds true for 
the spatial-interaction embedding models (Leonardi, 1980), and 
it is rooted in the earlier well-known result (Evans, 1973). 
Some care, however, should be taken when stating this always holds 
true for the third kind of models (right-hand side round box at 
the bottom of Figure 12!, although this can be shown for some 
meaningful cases (Hodgson, 1978; Hanjoul, 1980). Anyway, this 
limiting property has to be recommended as a criterion for 
choosing between good and bad models, since usually models which 
do not meet it are easily found to have some inconsistency in 
theory and formulation. 
2.5 Towards More General Space-Time Structures 
2 . 5 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Although the problems of locating different interacting 
activities and of dynamic (n?ultistage) optimization have been 
mentioned, the general framework developed so far is mainly a 
static single-service one. This reflects the state of the 
existing literature, which is mainly concerned with static single- 
service location problems. It is felt, however, that the future 
of location planning tools is in dynamic multi-service (or multi- 
activity) location models. 
The reason for multi-service systems becomes apparent if, 
for instance, the assumption of home-based return trips is 
dropped, and more general multiple-destination trips are allowed 
for the users. Multiple trips link all services and activities 
together (including residence), and a public decision on how to 
optimally locate them has to take these links into account. The 
reason for dynamics becomes apparent when it is realized that 
services have to be located in a built environment, with already 
existing facilities. Most static location models are very 
unrealistic in this respect, as they seem to assume that every- 
thing has to be built from scratch, except demand locations and 
sizes. But the real urban management problem has to deal with 
existing physical stocks of facilities, which means that capacity 
expansion, demolition, and relocation, rather than simple-minded 
optimal location, are the meaningful decisions. Of course, a 
dynamic framework is required for such decisions, since the urban 
manager has to take into account both the past (the current 
demand and stock of facilities) and the future (demand changes 
and influence of changes in current stock on future demand- 
facility interaction). 
The above stated problems cannot be .treated with the same 
detail used for static facility location problems, since they 
need a substantial amount of new theoretical and empirical 
research, which must still be carried out. Only an outline will 
be given here for some of the possible issues for future research 
programs, with no claim of exhaustiveness. 
2.5.2 The MuZtiactivity Location Problem 
The multi-activity location problem dates back as far as 
Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), for a normative approach, and 
Lowry (1964), for a descriptive approach. The simple, and yet 
powerful, Lowry framework has been given a mathematical- 
programming interpretation by Coehlo and Williams (1978), Wilson 
(1 978), Leonardi (1 979a) , MacGill and Wilson (1 979) , and 
Shmulyan (1980), thus leading towards its possible use as an 
explicitly normative tool. ~uilding on the above mentioned refer- 
ences, a possible multiactivity generalization of model (19)-(20) 
is as follows: 
max (Y (s)  - z hk ( z s i j  +sk O j 1 1  
s j k  ' i 
where a l l  v a r i a b l e s  and  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  d e f i n e d  a s  b e f o r e ,  e x c e p t  
f o r  t h e  s u p e r s c r i p t  k and r ,  l a b e l i n g  d i f f e r e n t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and 
a t h e  r a t i o  o f  k - a c t i v i t y  demand t o  r - a c t i v i t y  demand. Some- 
r k '  
t i m e s  ( b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y )  t h e  a r k  c o e f f i c i e n t s  c a n  b e  i n t e r -  
p r e t e d  a s  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  More g e n e r a l l y ,  t h e  { a r k }  
a r r a y  i n t r o d u c e s  a  l i n e a r  t echno logy  t y i n g  a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  
t o g e t h e r ;  i n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  c o n s t r a i n t s  ( 2 2 )  c a n  be  i n t e r p r e t e d  as 
some k i n d  of s p a t i a l  breakdown o f  a n  i n p u t - o u t p u t - l i k e  model.  
Indeed,  i f  summation o v e r  i i s  t a k e n  on b o t h  s i d e s  o f  ( 2 2 ) ,  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  s e t  o f  e q u a t i o n s  i s  o b t a i n e d :  
where : 
i s  t h e  t o t a l  a c t u a l  ( s a t i s f i e d )  
demand f o r  a c t i v i t y  k ,  
k k  
Y = U P i - S i o )  i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  poten-  
i t i a l  denand f o r  a c t i v i t y  k o r i g i n a t i n g  
i n  demand r e s i d e n c e s  and t h e  u n s a t i s -  
f i e d  demand f o r  a c t i v i t y  k .  
I f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v e c t o r  and m a t r i x  n o t a t i o n  i s  i n t r o d u c e d :  
t h e n  ( 2 3 )  becomes: 
and i t s  e x p l i c i t  s o l u t i o n ,  f o r  Y g i v e n ,  is :  
The resemblance  of  ( 2 5 )  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  s o l u t i o n  of  a n  i n p u t - o u t p u t  
model t h u s  becomes e v i d e n t .  But t h e  main i n t e r e s t i n g  f e a t u r e  of  
(25) is that, unlike in the usual input-output case, the total 
demand vector Y is not qiven. Because of its definition, it 
depends on unsatisfied demand, which in turn depends on the 
accessibility-sensitive demand generation mechanism. This means 
that the total demand vector is affected by the spqtial-interaction 
process. This is a warning for every top-to-bottom resource 
allocation procedure: feedbacks come from the bottom, and differ- 
ent locational policies may require changes in higher-level 
resource allocation policies. 
2.5.3 The Dynamic-Location Problem 
The dynamic-location problem was first introduced in Manne 
(1967), in a mainly private-sector oriented fashion. It was 
further extensively reviewed by Scott (1 971 ) , Sheppard (1 974) , and 
Erlenkotter (1979). A new operational approach for solving 
dynamic-location problems has recently been developed by Van Roy 
and Erlenkotter (1980). The trouble is, that all these works 
refer to linear objective functions, and no spatial-interaction 
behavior is taken into account. Moreover, they are mainly oriented 
towards capacity expansion for growing demand in a finite time 
horizon (although this assumption has been relaxed to some extent 
recently, see Van Roy and Erlenkotter, 1980). On the other hand, 
in most developed countries urban managers are faced with problems 
of fast fluctuating (sometimes declining) demand, the fluctuations 
taking place over time, space (because of migrations and residential 
mobility),and kind of services. (For instance, although total high 
school demand is usually growing everywhere, specializations 
required from the labor market may change over time.) At the same 
time, the average life of urban stocks is usually very long, and 
decisions on expansion, demolition and relocation are forced to be 
slower than the demand-changing process. 
I£ a rephrasing of the dynamic location problems in terms of 
classical operations research model forms is attempted, one might 
say that, while the capacity-expansion oriented approach raises 
mainly a job-scheduling problem, the urban stocks management 
approach raises mainly an inventory problem. This difference leads 
t o  two v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  ways t o  d e f i n e  a n  o p t i m a l  p o l i c y ,  a s  w e l l  
a s  two v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  p l a n n i n g  p h i l o s o p h i e s .  
1 .  F o r  f i n i t e - h o r i z o n  c a p a c i t y  e x p a n s i o n ,  a n  o p t i m a l  p o l i c y  
i s  a  p r o j e c t ;  t h a t  i s ,  a  l i s t  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  be  opened  
and  c l o s e d  a t  e a c h  t i m e  p e r i o d .  
2 .  F o r  unbounded-hor izon  u r b a n  s t o c k  management, a n  o p t i m a l  
p o l i c y  i s  a n  i n v e n t o r y  r u l e ;  t h a t  i s ,  a  r u l e  wh ich ,  
g i v e n  t h e  c u r r e n t  knowledge o f  a c t u a l  demand, i t s  
p o s s i b l e  f o r e c a s t s ,  and  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t o c k  l e v e l s  i n  e a c h  
l o c a t i o n ,  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  b e s t  way t h e s e  s t o c k  l e v e l s  
s h o u l d  b e  changed .  
Thus,  w h i l e  i n  a p p r o c h  1  t h e  main c o n c e r n  w i l l  b e  how much, where ,  
and  when t o  b u i l d ,  a p p r o a c h  2  w i l l  l e a d  t o  p rob lems  l i k e  u n c e r t a i n -  
t y  o v e r  f u t u r e  demand, a d a p t i v e  u p d a t i n g  mechanisms,  and  m o n i t o r -  
i n g  i n d i c a t o r s  f o r  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  s y s t e m  r e q u i r i n g  new d e c i s i o n s .  
The mode l ing  of  s u c h  s y s t e m s  w i l l  n o t  be  a t t e m p t e d  h e r e ,  b u t  i t  
i s  o n e  o f  t h e  e x p e c t e d  r e s u l t s  o f  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h .  
3 =  SOME UNIFYING PROPOSALS FOR STATIC FACILITY LOCATION MODELS 
3.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n  
T h i s  s e c t i o n  e x p l o r e s  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  and  t h e  p o s s i b l e  
s o l u t i o n  methods  f o r  p roblem ( 1 9 ) -  ( 2 0 )  i n  t h e  s p e c i a l  case when a  
s p a t i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  model  g i v e n  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 1 )  h o l d s ,  and  t h e  
s p a c e  d i s c o u n t  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  n e g a t i v e  e x p o n e n t i a l .  I t  h a s  b e e n  
shown by Neuburger  (1971)  t h a t  t h e  s p a t i a l - i n t e r a c t i o n  embedding 
f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h e s e  models  h a s  t h e  g e n e r a l  form 
1 S . .  l o g s  Y (s) = - - i j  - 1 sij cij  e i j  11 ij 
where  
3 i s  t h e  s p a c e  d i s c o u n t  f a c t o r .  
Neuburger  a l s o  shows t h a t ,  i f  t h e  s p a t i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  model i s  
l o o k e d  a t  a s  a  demand f u n c t i o n  ( t r a n s p o r t  c o s t s  c i j  b e i n g  t h e  
prices), then (26) can be interpreted as the consumers' surplus 
associated with the allocation matrix { s  and the travel cost i j 
matrix { c i j } .  The function defined by (26) is therefore the most 
natural measure of users' benefit, consistent with the assumed 
spatial interaction behavior, and the best suited evaluation 
criterion for a public decision maker. The function (26) is also 
related to Wilson's e.ntropy function (Wilson, 1 9 7 0 ) ,  although, as 
Neuburger points out, the analogy is only formal and no deep 
meaning should be looked for in it. 
It will be noticed in (26) that, if 6+w, then Y (S) reduces 
to a simple linear total transport cost term. Therefore, linear 
problems of the plant-location type are included in (26) as 
special cases. 
The aim of the next sections is both to review the main 
existing formulations of the spatial-interaction embedding location 
problems, and to propose new possible models. 
The exposition will be in order of increasing complexity, 
starting with the simplest case of inelastic-demand linear-budget 
constrained models, and introducing gradually elastic demand, 
existing stock, nonlinear cost functions. All the problems are 
formulated in the first standard form discussed in 2.4.2, that is, 
maximizing users' benefit subject to a constraint on total budget. 
3.2. Linear Budget Constraints 
3 .2 .7  T h e  Fixed  Demand Case 
If a Neuburger consumer surplus function of the form (26) is 
assumed as a measure of users' benefit, and if the cost for 
establishing and running the facilities are linear functions of 
the form: 
where 
h . ( x j )  is the total cost for a facility of size 
3 (capacity) x j in location j 
a is the cost per unit size in location j j 
b is the fixed (size-independent) cost to be paid j for opening a facility in j 
Then the general location model with fixed total demand assumes 
the following form: 
1 
min 
- ' ' i j  log i j  + z z S i j  C i j  S , L , X  B ~ ~ E L  i j C L  
subject to 
C ( a ,  x + b.) < B 
j EL I j I - 
(the constraints s i j  > - 0 are not needed, since the objective 
function is not defined for negative values), where: 
i labels the demand locations, which are given 
j labels the locations of facilities 
L is the subset of chosen facility locations, among 
all possible given locations; the subset L is not 
given, but it has to be determined by optimization 
'i is the flow of users from demand location i to facility j ,  for  EL (here only users' attracting 
systems are considered) 
is the total demand in location i 
'i i s  t h e  c o s t  of a  t r i p  from demand l o c a t i o n  i t o  f a c i l i t y  i n  l o c a t i o n  j  
x i s  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  f a c i l i t y  i n  l o c a t i o n  j ,  f o r  
j   EL 
B i s  t h e  t o t a l  budget  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  and 
running a l l  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  
The problem of choosing t h e  s u b s e t  L induces  combina to r i a l  
f e a t u r e s  i n  t h e  above mathematical  program. I f ,  a s  a  s p e c i a l  ca se ,  
6-+ , t h e  f i r s t  t e r m  i n  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  d i s a p p e a r s ,  and 
t h e  above problem becomes: 
min 
' ' i j  ' ij s , L , X  i j&L 
s u b j e c t  t o  
C ( a ,  x + b . )  < B 
 EL j  3 - 
(Now c o n s t r a i n t s  s > 0 a r e  needed.)  i j  - 
Since  t h e r e  i s  no need t o  ma in t a in  unused capacity,when t h e  
budget  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  binding  ( t h e  most s e n s i b l e  c a s e )  it w i l l  
a l s o  be: 
That i s ,  t h e  t o t a l  c a p a c i t y  of t h e  f a c i l i t y  i n  l o c a t i o n  j  i s  set 
equa l  t o  t h e  t o t a l  demand a t t r a c t e d  i n  j .  The v a r i a b l e s  x can j 
thus be eliminated, and the resulting location problem, containing 
the variables sij and the subset L only, is as follows: 
min E 1 Sij Cij 
s,L i  EL 
subject to 
C ( a .  x + b . )  = B 
 EL j J 
The above problem is the standard budget-constrained location 
problem found in the operations research literature (ReVelle, 
Marks, Liebman, 1970; ReVelle and Rojeski, 1970; Hansen and 
Kaufman, 1976). It has thus been shown how, when the spatial 
discount rate ,!3 tends to infinity, the spatial-interaction-based 
location model tends to the plant-location model, and the induced 
limiting form in users' behavior follows the nearest-facility 
allocation rule. 
In the most meaningful cases, however, ,!3 will not be infinity, 
and the plant-location models cannot be used. The resulting non- 
linear combinatorial problems are discussed in Leonardi (1980), 
and results are forthcoming on efficient algorithms to solve 
these problems and make sensitivity analysis on the space discount 
rate and the budget level. 
However, without going into the technical details of the 
algorithmic problems (which are outside of the scope of this 
paper), much insight can be gained in understanding the structure 
of the spatial-interaction-based location model, if its combin- 
atorial part (that is, the set L) is held constant. If L is given, 
it can be dropped from the list of control variables, and the 
problem can be rewritten as: 
1 
min - C s logs 
i j ij + Ca Sij Cij S I X  ' ij 1 I 
subject to 
where R is defined as: 
R = B - C b the remaining budget after the fixed costs 
j EL j for opening the facilities have been de- 
duced; with no loss of generality, R will 
also be called "the budget" from now on 
Problem (27)-(31) is a convex programming problem with linear 
constraints. (It can be easily shown that the objective function 
(27) is convex.) It therefore has a unique optimal solution, and 
the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions are necessary and sufficient 
to identify it. The special structure of the objective function, 
together with the simplicity of the constraints, makes it possible 
to find explicit cl.osed-form solutions for the flow variables s i j 
and for the facility sizes x , and to analyze the sensitivity to j 
changes on the budget level R. Three cases can be given. 
1. The budget is more than is needed, so that constraint 
(30) is not binding. 
2. The budget is scarce, but enough to satisfy all the 
required capacity, so that constraint (30) is binding. 
3. The budget is not enough to satisfy all the required 
capacity, so that no solution to inequalities (29) can 
be found. 
In the first case constraint (30) can be dropped, and also 
constraints (29) and (31) lose meaning. The optimal values for 
the flow variables s i j  are the solution to the following mathe- 
matical programming problem. 
subject to 
BY using the standard Lagrange-multipliers method, we easily obtain 
for the optimal si j  : 
where 
We can now state the conditions under which ( 3 4 )  is actually 
the solution to ( 2 7 )  - ( 3 1  ) . The total size of the facility in j 
must be not less than the total demand attracted in j, so that 
its minimum feasible value is 
From ( 3 6 )  it follows that the total cost of our location plan 
cannot be less than 
Thus 
- 
if R > - 5 , x as computed by (36) is an optimal j 
solution to problem (27)-(31) 
if R < R , the budget constraint becomes binding and 
can no longer be neglected. 
The second case applies when the budget satisfies the 
inequalities 
where 5 is given by (37) . The meaning of the left-hand side of 
(38) is as follows: the lowest cost solution is to locate just 
one big facility in the cheapest location, regardless of travel 
costs for the users. We require that the budget be not less 
than the cost of the lowest cost solution. 
Because of (38), constraint (30)is now binding, so that it 
is always a strict equality. This will be true for constraints 
(2g)as well, since a slack capacity in the facilities could only 
be afforded if we had excess budget, or R > R ,  which contradicts 
condition (38) . 
The x variables can be eliminated, since the size of each j 
facility is equal to the number of users it attracts. Problem 
(27)-(31) reduces to 
min + C s  i j i j ij 'ij 
sub j ect to 
and use of the Lagrange-multiplier technique yields for the 
general solution 
where 
X is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint (41). 
Comparing. (42) and (34), we see that (34) reduces to (42) if we 
put X = 0 .  The term 
can thus be considered as a special attraction weight for each 
location, attractiveness being decreasing with the unit cost in the 
location. Each location has a different attraction weight and only 
when the budget constraint is not binding, that is when X = o, 
will all locations have equal weights. One remark is perhaps 
needed on these attractiveness weights. From the way they are 
built, one might argue that prices b are charged to the users. j 
But no pricing policy is assumed here. Constraints (29) have been 
dropped by algebraic manipulation only, but they are still acting. 
What users perceive is the capacity offered in j, x , and not the j 
unit cost b , which is paid by the public decision maker. Thus, in j 
spite of how it looks, (42) arises from a doubly-constrained 
spatial interaction behavior. 
It is useful to analyze the size of the facilities as a 
function of A, in order to find the sensitivity of the solution 
to changes in the available budget. Let us define 
-Xaj f.. e 
I t  can  be shown t h a t  t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  ( 4 3 )  i s  g i v e n  by 
where sij and x a r e  g i v e n  by ( 4 2 )  and ( 4 3 )  , and ai i s  d e f i n e d  j 
t h e  ave r age  u n i t  c o s t  weighted  w i t h  t h e  f l ows  coming frcm i .  
I?eriva+:ives ( 4 4 )  v a n i s h  i f  
and,  i f  ( b 5 1  h a s  a  s o l u t i o n ,  convex i t y  o f  ( 3 9 )  a s s u r e s  it  a s  a n  
op t ima l  one  f o r  problem ( 3 9 ) - ( 4 1 ) .  
Other  e a s i l y  found r e s u l t s  a r e  
I 
Zipi  , i f  a = min a j k k 
x , (p) = 
3 
0 , i f  a :. min a j k k 
The above  q u a n t i t i e s  c a n  b e  used  t o  c l a s s i f y  l o c a t i o n s  i n t o  t h r e e  
main g r o u p s :  
1 .  I f  x ' ( O )  > 0 and a = min a t h e  g r a p h  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  j j k k ' 
% . ( A )  h a s  t h e  s h a p e  shown i n  F i g u r e  1 3 .  T h a t  i s ,  t h e  s i z e  
I 
o f  t h e  f a c i l i t y  i n  t h e  l o c a t i o n  w i t h  minimum cost  i s  i n -  
c r e a s i n g  w i t h  X ,  and it a t t r a c t s  a l l  t h e  demand i n  t h e  
l i m i t ,  when X + w and  R a p p r o a c h e s  t h e  l e f t - h a n d  s i d e  o f  
( 3 8 ) .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  when r e s o u r c e s  become s c a r c e ,  t h e  
l o c a t i o n  c o s t  becomes t h e  main c r i t e r i o n  t o  d e c i d e  o n  s i z e  
and  l o c a t i o n ,  and  t h e  o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n  t e n d s  t o  concen-  
t r a t e  i n  o n e  s i n g l e  l o c a t i o n  (namely ,  t h e  c h e a p e s t  o n e ) .  
F i g u r e  13 .  S i z e  o f  f a c i l i t y  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  b u d g e t  
m u l t i p l i e r .  Case 1:  c h e a p e s t  l o c a t i o n .  
2. I f  x : ( o )  > o and aj > min a t h e  g r aph  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  
3 k k ' 
x ( A )  has  t h e  shape  shown i n  F i g u r e  14. Equa t ion  (45)  j 
h a s  a f i n i t e  s o l u t i o n  'Xk  s o  t h a t  t h e  s i z e  x  rises t o  j 
a  maximum x! f o r  o < X  < A *  , and t h e n  f a l l s  a g a i n  f o r  
3 - 
h > A *  . I n  o t h e r  words, f o r  t h i s  k ind  of  l o c a t i o n  t h e r e  
i s  a  t h r e s h o l d  v a l u e  f o r  t h e  budget ,  above which it i s  
conven i en t  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  s i z e  of  t h e  f a c i l i t y  t h e r e ,  
and below which f a c i l i t y  must  b e  abandoned i n  f a v o r  o f  
cheaper  l o c a t i o n s .  
F i g u r e  14. S i z e  of f a c i l i t y  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of  t h e  budget  
m u l t i p l i e r .  C a s e  2 :  i n t e r m e d i a t e  c o s t  
l o c a t i o n .  
3 .  If x:(o) < 0 and aj > min a k ,  the graph of the function 
I 
x (A) is shaped as in Figure 15. Equation (45) has no j 
finite solution in this case, so that the size x de- j  
creases monotonically with A. This is clearly the worst 
kind of location, as far as scarce resources are concerned. 
The size of the facility there decreases for any decrease 
in the budget. 
Figure 15. Size of facility as a function of the budget 
multiplier. Case 3: high cost location. 
The previous analysis, simple as it is, reveals two facts. 
Even with linear costs (that is, with no scale economies) 
concentration effects can be caused by low budgets. This 
is mainly due to the double-constrained nature of the 
model, and in particular to constraint (29), requiring 
demand not exceeding capacity for each facility. 
There is nothing like a fixed hierarchy among the sizes 
in each location. Changes in the total budget can turn 
the distribution of facilities upside down, so that what 
seemed to be a good location may be abandoned and what 
seemed to be a bad location may be chosen. 
Parametric formulas (43) can be used quite easily to get 
actual numerical solutions. We can build the total cost function: 
which can be easily shown to be monotonically nonincreasing for 
X > o and such that 
- 
T(c0) = imin a C P 
i i k 
where 
- 
R is defined by (37) . 
(The graph of T ( X )  is shown in Figure 16) Provided the actual budget 
R satisfies (38), the optimal value of the multiplier X is the 
root of the following eauation 
which can be solved quite easily by numerical methods. 
( m i  n 
k 
Figure  16. T o t a l  c o s t  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  budget m u l t i p l i e r .  
I n  t h e  t h i r d  c a s e  w e  have: 
t h a t  i s ,  t h e  budget i s  n o t  even enough t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  a l l  t h e  
demand i n  t h e  cheapes t  zone. A s  can be seen i n  F igu re  16 t h e r e  
i s  no r e a l  s o l u t i o n  t o  (50)  i n  t h e  r eg ion  de f ined  by ( 5 1 ) ,  t h a t  
i s ,  t h e  f e a s i b l e  s e t  of problem ( 2 7 ) - ( 3 1 )  i s  empty. I n  a c t u a l  
a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  what we can do i n  t h i s  c a s e  i s  e i t h e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  
t h e  budget  or  t o  s l acken  c o n d i t i o n  ( 2 9 )  by a l lowing  f o r  some 
overcrowding i n  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s .  This  can be done by fo rmula t ing  
the mathematical programming problem: 
1 
min L s log Si + L S i j  C i j  
i j  i I 
subject to 
where 
p is the maximum allowable density, as measured by 
the ratio number of users/facility size. 
Problem (52)-(56) can be reduced to the same form as problem 
(39) - (41 ) . If we eliminate the x variables by means of (54) and 
j  
define 
we get the problem 
1 
min - L S i j  log S i j  + S 
' i j  i j  i j  ' i j  
subject to 
which is the same as problem (39)-(Ul), if we replace a by a; . j 
A common question to be asked in applications is how big the 
density p must be in order to meet the budget constraint. The 
minimum value of P can be found by imposing the condition 
I R > ( E  p i )  rnin - 
- 
i j P 
which ensures a non-empty feasible set. Solving for P we get 
a .  Zipi 
p > min 
- (61 1 
j 
The right-hand term is the ratio between the cost of establishing 
a facility big enough to have no congestion and the actual 
resources we can use to establish the facility. When this ratio 
is greater than one even in the cheapest location, it gives us 
a measure of the least trade-off that is necessary between con- 
ge.s tion and 'resources. 
3 . 2 , 2  E l a s t i c  Demand Case  
It will now be shown how a special form of demand sensitive- 
ness to accessibility can be introduced, which is consistent with 
a general Neuburger consumer surplus function. 
The proposed general form is: 
1 
min L ( P ~ - G ~ ) ~ o ~ ( P ~ - G . )  + 1 S i j l o g S  + 
1 i i j i j 
sub j ec t to 
(the implicit constraints s i j  - > o an?, G P are automatically i -  i 
accounted for by the form of the objective function) where the 
definitions of the variables are the same as for the fixed-demand 
model (27)-(31), except for the new ones: 
Gi is the total actual demand in i (not fixed, but to 
be found) 
io is a parameter which can be interpreted as the 
"cost" associated with having no destination, that 
is, not being a user of any facility. 
It must be stressed that, unlike in the fixed demand model, 
here the total actual demand which will be generated in each 
demand location is not fixed and known in advance, but has to be 
determined as a function of the offered service itself. However, 
we still assume an upper bound pi is known for the demand in 
location i, and actual demand G~ will be generally less than pi. 
This upper bound can be interpreted as the potential demand in i t  
that is, the demand which would be generated with infinite acces- 
sibility to the service. The special form of the "entropy" term 
in the objective function (62) has been adopted to embed both the 
flow (or allocation) variables s  and the generated demands G . i j i 
The elastic demand assumption is probably not the best suited 
one for those services which satisfy real needs (for instance, 
primary schools or emergency medical care). It is surely sound 
in many other services, however, such as high schools, libraries, 
recreational services, and also some health care facilities such 
as hospitals. 
In analogy with the fixed-demand model, it can be shown how 
(62)-(65) is a general formulation which includes other models as 
special cases. - If, for example, only all-or-nothing values for 
the x variables and nearest-facility allocations are allowed, j  
we get a special form of the price-sensitive demand location 
models discussed in Wagner and Falkson (1975) and in Erlenkotter 
(1977). It is shown in these references how some changes of 
variables bring this problem back to the standard form of the 
plant-location mode1,so that the usual algorithms can be used. 
Let us now go back to the more general model (62)-(651, and make 
a very simple, but fundamental observation. 
Let us define the variables 
and assume 
Let, also, the summations over j start from 0 .  Then it is easily 
seen that problem (62)-(65) is equivalent to the following 
problem: 
I 
min L Sij  l o g s i j  + L S i j  C .  
i j  i j  1 j  
suhj ect to 
A c o ~ p a r i s o n  w i t h  problem ( 2 7 ) - ( 3 1 )  shows t h a t  t h e  two 
problems a r e  c o m p l e t e l y  i d e n t i c a l .  What w e  have  d o n e  i s  t o  i n t r o -  
d u c e  a  dummy l o c a t i o n ,  l a b e l e d  a s  j = 0 ,  where  a  dummy f a c i l i t y  
w i l l  b e  l o c a t e d  a t  no c o s t .  The dummy f a c i l i t y  w i l l  b e  made b i g  
enough t o  s e r v e  a l l  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  demand which i s  n o t  s e r v e d  by 
t h e  r e a l  f a c i l i t i e s .  
The above  o b s e r v a t i o n  means t h a t  a l l  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  and  com- 
p u t a t i o n a l  problems r e l a t e d  t o  model ( 6 2 ) - ( 6 5 )  c a n  be  s o l v e d  by 
t h e  same a p p r o a c h e s  d e v e l o p e d  f o r  t h e  fixed-demand model ,  w i t h  
o n l y  s l i g h t  c h a n g e s .  However, t h e  main r e s u l t s  w i l l  b e  r e s t a t e d  
i n  new t e r m s  f o r  c o n v e n i e n c e .  I n  what  f o l l o w s ,  summations o v e r  j  
w i l l  be a g a i n  w i t h  j  # 0 ,  
L e t  u s  d e f i n e  
-Aaj 
w = e t t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  w e i g h t  i n  l o c a t i o n  j  
j  ( A  i s  t h e  Lagrange  m u l t i p l i e r  
f o r  t h e  b u d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t )  
-Bcio 
f = e  
i0 I where cio are g i v e n  c o n s t a n t s  
-6 C t j  f i j  = e t t h e  e x p o n e n t i a l  d e c a y  f a c t o r  f o r  
a  t r a v e l  c o s t  c 
i j  
I n . =  C f  w 
1 
t h e  Hansen (1959)  measu re  o f  a c c e s -  i j  j  ' j 
s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  s e r v i c e  f rom t h e  
demand p o i n t  i 
Then w e  have :  
We see from (66) how the elastic demand assumption works. 
The total actual demand generated in i, Gi, is a function of the 
accessibility to the service from i; it is zero for zero acces- 
sibility (which means no available facilities) and tends to the 
total potential demand pi for infinite accessibility. The shape 
of (66) is shown in Figure 17. (compare with Figure 7) . 
We conclude this section by noting that, unlike in the fixed 
demand case, here the feasible region is non-empty for any R > - 0, 
since the unsatisfied potential demand is automatically pushed 
out of the system by the elastic-demand mechanism implied by (66). 
Figure 17. Total demand in i as a function of accessibility. 
3 . 2 . 3  Models w i t h o u t  C a p a c i t y  C o n s t r a i n t s  
It has already been stressed that the models discussed in 
3.2.1 and 3.2.2 are doubly constrained, because they have con- 
straints both on the total demand coming from each location and 
on the total number of users that can be served at each location. 
Equality between attracted demand and available capacity in each 
location is always required. If this assumption is dropped, 
another family of location models is obtained. These models, 
first introduced for the location of retail trade (Harris, 1964; 
Lakshmanan and Hansen, 1965; Huff, 1964, 1966) assume that the 
users' behavior is described by a spatial-interaction model with 
no constraints on the destinations, where the attractiveness of 
the facilities is measured by a nondecreasing function of their 
size (usually a power function). Although these models were 
mainly used for retail trade location, it is argued that they 
might be useful for some kinds of public services too. 
Recently, mathematical programming formulations, related to 
the ones already discussed in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, have been 
developed for these models. They are briefly discussed here. 
The usual general form for these models is (Coelho and 
Wilson, 1976) : 
C1 
max c s ( -  l o g x  - c . . )  - &  c s 104s 
i j  B j  I B i j  i j  i j  
s,x i j  
subject to 
Anothe r  fo rm wh ich  h a s  been  shown t o  b e  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  ( 6 9 ) - ( 7 2 ) ,  
and  wh ich  c o n t a i n s  t h e  x v a r i a b l e s  o n l y ,  i s  g i v e n  by L e o n a r d i  j 
(7973 ,  1978)  : 
-6 c max C P. l o g C  x a e  ij 
X i 1 j j 
s u b j e c t  t o  
I n  b o t h  cases, t h e  g e n e r a l  s o l u t i o n  m u s t  s a t i s f y  t h e  con- 
d i t i o n s  (see t h e  a b o v e  r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  t h e  p r o o f ) :  
whe re  
'i j i s  t h e  f l o w  o f  u s e r s  f rom i t o  j 
a n d  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o d u c t i o n - c o n s t r a i n e d  s p a t i a l  
i n t e r a c t i o n  model :  
C o n d i t i o n  ( 7 6 )  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  budget  must be  a l l o c a t e d  t o  
l o c a t i o n s  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  t o t a l  demand t h e y  a t t r a c t .  T h i s  
b a l a n c i n g  p r i n c i p l e ,  more o r  less e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d ,  h a s  been 
wide ly  used o v e r  a  l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e .  A r e c e n t  r ev iew o f  t h e  
c o n c e p t ,  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  and e x t e n s i o n s  c a n  be  found i n  H a r r i s  
and Wilson ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  E q u a t i o n s  ( 7 6 )  c a n  be  e a s i l y  s o l v e d  by a  
f i r s t - o r d e r  i t e r a t i o n  t e c h n i q u e  o v e r  t h e  x . j 
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  compare t h e  main f e a t u r e s  o f  problem 
(69)  - ( 7 2 )  w i t h  t h e  ones  of  problem ( 2 6 ) -  (30)  . I n  t h e  more mean- 
i n g f u l  c a s e  w e  have t h a t  i n e q u a l i t y  (38)  h o l d s ,  s o  t h a t  f o r  ( 2 6 )  - 
(30)  it must be 
But t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  w i l l  n e v e r  be l i k e  ( 7 6 ) ,  u n l e s s  R = C 2 and i 
a l l  a ,  a r e  e q u a l ,  t h a t  i s ,  w e  have no d i f f e r e n c e s  amongi 
J 
l o c a t i o n  c o s t s .  
Another  i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  found i n  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  
of  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s i z e  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  changes  i n  t h e  budge t .  
Indeed,  model ( 6 9 ) - ( 7 2 )  i s  e a s i l y  s e e n  n o t  t o  be  s e n s i t i v e  a t  a l l ,  
s i n c e  i t  keeps  t h e  same r e l a t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s i z e s  and l o c a -  
t i o n s  f o r  a l l  t h e  p o s s i b l e  budge t  v a l u e s ,  and no c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
o c c u r s  because  o f  t h e  s c a r c i t y  o f  r e s o u r c e s .  
3 . 2 . 4  Optimal Location with a Partially Existing Stock 
I n  t h e  models d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  p r e c e e d i n g  s e c t i o n s  no 
d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  made between d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  c o s t s .  W e  assume 
a  g e n e r a l  o v e r a l l  u n i t  c o s t  f o r  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s ,  which w i l l  
p o s s i b l y  i n c l u d e  b o t h  b u i l d i n g  and r u n n i n g  c o s t s .  W e  a l s o  assume 
t h a t  b o t h  c o s t s  a r e  a lways  m e t  f o r  e v e r y  f a c i l i t y ;  t h i s  i s  t h e  
same a s  assuming t h a t  w e  always  b u i l d  new f a c i l i t i e s  and d o  n o t  
t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  e x i s t i n g  o n e s ,  i f  any.  
I n  a  more r e a l i s t i c  s e t t i n g ,  however, l o c a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s  
a r e  made based on a n  a l r e a d y  b u i l t  envi ronment ,  where a n  e x i s t i n g  
s t o c k  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  i s  u s u a l l y  a v a i l a b l e .  I n  t h e  more g e n e r a l  
c a s e ,  d e c i s i o n s  have t o  be made on expanding t h e  e x i s t i n g  
c a p a c i t y  by b u i l d i n g  new f a c i l i t i e s ,  u s i n g  p a r t  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
c a p a c i t y ,  and c l o s i n g  down some of t h e  e x i s t i n g  f a c i l i t i e s .  Each 
one of  t h e s e  a c t i o n s  i m p l i e s  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  o f  c o s t s ,  and i n  
what f o l l o w s  w e  w i l l  t r y  t o  t a k e  t h i s  i n t o  account .  
I t  should  be  a l s o  s t r e s s e d  beforehand t h a t  l o c a t i o n  problems 
w i t h  p a r t i a l l y  e x i s t i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  l e a d  n a t u r a l l y  t o  dynamic 
fo rmu la t i ons .  The models d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  can  t h u s  be 
looked upon as a  f i r s t  s t e p  towards dynamic g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s .  The 
t h i r d  k ind  o f  c o s t s  ( demol i t i on  c o s t s )  w i l l  n o t  be i n t roduced ,  
s i n c e  d e m o l i t i o n  i s  o n l y  j u s t i f i e d  i n  a  f u l l y  dynamic fo rmu la t i on  
o f  t h e  problem. However, most of  t h e  r e s u l t s  c a n  be e a s i l y  
g e n e r a l i z e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  account  f o r  t h i s  problem i f  t h e  o p t i o n  o f  
demol ishing p a r t  o f  t h e  unused c a p a c i t y  is  added. 
W e  propose  two main models: t h e  f i r s t  one w i t h  s imple  l i n e a r  
b u i l d i n g  c o s t s  added, and t h e  second one w i t h  f i x e d  cha rges  i n  
b u i l d i n g  c o s t s  added. 
1 .  For  l i n e a r  b u i l d i n g  c o s t s ,  and w i t h  a  g e n e r a l  o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n  a s  i n  (26), w e  have t h e  problem 
I 
min E log Sij  + 
i j  " ' i j  'ij 1 3  
s u b j e c t  t o  
where 
'j i s  t h e  e x i s t i n g  c a p a c i t y  i n  u s e  a t  l o c a t i o n  j 
z i s  t h e  newly b u i l t  c a p a c i t y  i n  l o c a t i o n  j 
j 
v i s  t h e  t o t a l  e x i s t i n g  c a p a c i t y  i n  l o c a t i o n  j j 
b i s  t h e  u n i t  b u i l d i n g  c o s t  i n  l o c a t i o n  j j 
d i s  t h e  u n i t  c o s t  f o r  h o l d i n g  unused c a p a c i t y  j 
i n  l o c a t i o n  j 
The f o l l o w i n g  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  g e n e r a l  s o l u t i o n  t o  ( 7 8 ) -  
( 8 3 )  a r e  e a s i l y  proved by means of t h e  Kuhn-Tucker o p t i -  
m a l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s .  
a .  The s o l u t i o n  h a s  a lways  tlie form 
Tha t  i s ,  it i s  n e e d l e s s  t o  expand t h e  c a p a c i t y  of  t h e  
s e r v i c e  where t h e  e x i s t i n g  one i s  n o t  c o m p l e t e l y  used .  
b. I f  f o r  any l o c a t i o n  j we have 
t h e n  y must e q u a l  v . That  i s ,  wherever  h o l d i n g  unused j j 
c a p a c i t y  i s  more c o s t l y  t h a n  u s i n g  it ,  t h e  t o t a l  e x i s t i n g  
c a p a c i t y  i s  f u l l y  used .  
c .  When c o n s t r a i n t s  ( 8 0 )  and ( 8 1 )  a r e  b i n d i n g ,  w e  have f o r  
t h e  f low v a r i a b l e s  
where 
and X is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the 
budget constraint (81 ) . 
d. Accordinq to (841, the total size of the facility In 
each locaticn is given by 
and we have also 
for the old and new stock, respectively. 
As for the simpler model (26) - (30) , the solution 
for nonbinding constraints is found by putting X = 0. 
The minimum value for R under which the feasible set is 
empty can be found by concentrating as much demand as 
possible in the locations with the lowest a values j 
(u s ing  t h e  e x i s t i n g  c a p a c i t y  a s  much a s  p o s s i b l e ) ,  and 
t h e  remaining demand i n  t h e  l o c a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  lowest  
b u i l d i n g  c o s t s .  
Formulas ( 8 4 ) - ( 8 8 )  can be u s e f u l l y  compared wi th  
formulas  ( 4 2 ) - ( 4 7 )  i n  Sec t ion  3.2.1. The g e n e r a l  form 
of t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  b a s i c a l l y  t h e  same, t h e  on ly  d i f f e r -  
ence being i n  t h e  c o s t  terms ( 8 5 ) .  Unfor tuna te ly ,  we do 
n o t  know a p r i o r i  t h e  l o c a t i o n s  where c o n s t r a i n t  (82)  i s  
binding on t h e  r i g h t  s i d e ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  
changes i n  t h e  t o t a l  budget i s  l e s s  easy  t o  be analyzed.  
For b u i l d i n g  c o s t  w i th  f i x e d  cha rges ,  and wi th  a  g e n e r a l  
o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  a s  i n  ( 2 6 ) ,  we have t h e  problem 
min ' L sij log s f3 i j  + L S i j  C i j  
i j  i j 
s u b j e c t  t o  
where 
h i s  t h e  f i x e d  charge  t o  b u i l d  new f a c i l i t i e s  j 
i n  l o c a t i o n  j 
6 is a boolean variable, which is set to 1 when j 
capacity in j is expanded, and 0 otherwise 
M is a very large number. 
Model (89)-(95) looks very much like model (78) -(83), 
except for the new costs and the 6 variables. Provided j 
the values for the 6 are known, the model has the same j 
form and can be treated in the same way. Exact and/or 
heuristic methods to find the optimal 6 values are j 
therefore needed. This can be done with methods related 
to the ones developed for the classical plant-location 
problem. (The special structure of problem (89)-(95) has 
still to be exploited, however.) This is an area in 
which new research has still to be carried out. 
An elastic-demand version of (78) - (83) and (89)- (95) can be 
developed with the same approach used in model (69) - (72) . If (69) 
or (73) replace (78) and (63), it is easily shown that for the 
optimal solution we must have 
where 
X is a Lagrange multiplier. 
3.3 Nonlinear Budget Constraints 
3 . 3 . 1  The Basic Mode2 
If nonlinear cost functions replace the terms a. x in (30), 
I j 
the model (27)-(31) assumes the following form: 
1 min - 1  s logs + I S  c 
6 ij i j i j ij ij ij 
subject to 
where 
f . ( x . )  is the cost of a facility of size x  in 
I I j 
location j , with f  . ( 0 )  = 0 
3 
The functions f. ( - )  are assumed to be as smooth as needed and to 
1 
be concave nondecreasing. This means that scale economies are 
introduced in the model. 
By using the Lagrange-multiplier method it is found that the 
general solution to ( 9 7 )  - (1  0 0 )  when constraints ( 9 9 )  and ( 1  0 0 )  
are binding satisfies the following equations: 
for the flow variables, where we have defined 
f  ' ( x . )  is the first derivative of f . ( x . )  j I I I 
X is the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
constraint ( 1  0 0 )  . 
Equations ( 1  01 ) can be compared with ( 4 2 )  for the analogy; however, 
( 1 0 1 )  is not a closed-form solution, since the right-hand side is 
a function of the x variables. For these we can write the j 
equations 
where 
and x is the Ex. vector. The right-hand side of ( 1  0 1  ) can be 
3 
rearranged in a more meaningful way 
where we have defined 
a term which does not depend on x . ( 1 0 4 )  is a logistic in £ ! ( . )  , j 3 
so that we have for the derivatives 
where 
I, 
g .  (x.) = - f .  ( x . )  are the second derivatives of the 
3 3 3 3 
cost curves, changed in sign; g ( 0 )  
is always nonneqative because of 
the concavity assumption. 
The derivatives of the functions F.(o) defined by (103) are thus 
3 
given by 
S F .  
A further requirement has to be met by the functions f .  ( . ) ,  
I 
Of course we must have 
(104) shows that this happens only if 
that is, the cost curves have to be infinitely steep at the origin. 
This is a kind of smooth version of fixed-charge costs, which 
introduce scale economies by means of an infinitely steep initial 
jump. When condition (108) is not met, we can never have a 
solution with x.= o for some j; the linear-cost models are a 
3 
particular example of this general fact. 
Research has to be carried out to find convenient numerical 
solution methods to (102), possibly with special assumptions on 
the functions The simplest assumption that can be made is 
J 
that of constant elasticities, so that the f. ( o )  will be power 
3 
functions. They can be written in the following form: 
so that 
The following set of equations for the variables x and the 
j 
multiplier X should be solved: 
- h a j /  
h,, e 
This approach can be also used to build a nonlinear-cost version 
of models (69) - (72) and (73) - (75) , with size-dependent utility 
functions. One easily obtains for the optimal point the condi- 
tions 
which can be usefully canpared with (76). Elastic demand can be 
introduced as in Secticn 1.2, and needs no new formal tools. 
However, it must be recalled that the assumption of concavity 
for the cost functions destroys the uniqueness property of solu- 
tions to (97)-(loo), and multiple non-optimal solutions may be 
found. The usefulness of (110) and (111) to find numerical 
solutions is therefore limited, and must still be explored. 
3 , 3 . 2  Nonlinear Cost Functions with Partially Ezisting Stock 
The p roposed  model i s  ana logous  t o  t h e  o n e s  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  
S e c t i o n  3.2.4 : 
m i n i ;  sij l o g s  i j  + C sij c i j  
1 J 
s u b j e c t  t o  
where t h e  v a r i a b l e s  are  d e f i n e d  a s  i n  S e c t i o n  3.2.4,  and:  
f . ( - )  i s  t h e  r u n n i n g  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  f o r  l o c a t i o n  j ,  
3 
g j  ( - 1  i s  t h e  b u i l d i n g  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  f o r  l o c a t i o n  j ,  
h . ( - )  i s  t h e  unused c a p a c i t y  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  f o r  
3 
l o c a t i o n  j .  
The c o s t  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  assumed concave  n o n d e c r e a s i n g ,  s o  
t h a t  s c a l e  economies are i n t r o d u c e d .  
The f o l l o w i n g  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  g e n e r a l  s o l u t i o n  t o  ( 1 1 2 ) -  
(1 1 7 )  a r e  e a s i l y  p roved .  
i. The solution has always the form 
as in the linear-cost case. 
ii. If the inequality 
holds, that is, if the cost for holding the empty stock 
v is greater than the cost for using it, then we j 
always have 
so that location j will always have a facility size at 
least as great as the existing stock. 
iii. If the inequalities 
hold, then the equation 
has a root in (0,v.I: 
3 
and in location j we will have either 
iv. If the inequalities 
hold, in location j we will have 
v. When constraints ( 1 1 4 )  and ( 1 1 5 )  are binding, we have for 
the flow variables 
where 
X is the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
constaint ( 1  1 5 )  
-85-  
x i s  t h e  t o t a l  s i z e  of  t h e  f a c i l i t y  i n  l o c a t i o n  j j 
If we r e p l a c e  f . ( x  . ) w i t h  u . (x . ) as d e f i n e d  i n  ( 1  1 9 ) ,  equa- 
3 3  I 3  
t i o n s  (1 0 2 )  - ( 1 0 7 )  s t i l l  h o l d .  The n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  t o  have a 
zero- . s ize  f a c i l i t y  f o r  some l o c a t i o n  j i s  s t i l l  
and it i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t i c e  t h a t  t h i s  depends  on r u n n i n g  
c o s t s  o n l y .  
The above model c a n  be s p e c i a l i z e d  by i n t r o d u c i n g  e x p l i c i t  
forms f o r  t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n s ,  as i n  e q u a t i o n s  ( 1 0 9 ) - ( 1 1 1 ) .  
3 . 4  Towards a More G e n e r a l  Family o f  L o c a t i o n  Models 
3 . 4 , 1  T h e  General  Model 
The models  d i s c u s s e d  s o  f a r  have a  r a t h e r  s p e c i a l i z e d  o b j e c -  
t i v e  f u n c t i o n ,  r o o t e d  i n  Neuburger consumer s u r p l u s  maximizing 
and s p a t i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  t h e o r y .  It  h a s  been shown t h a t  t h i s  
form i s  g e n e r a l  enough t o  i n c l u d e  l i n e a r - i n t e g e r  p l a n t - l o c a t i o n  
models  as s p e c i a l  c a s e s .  It  h a s  a l s o  been shown t h a t  t h e  i n t r o -  
d u c t i o n  of  a p p r o p r i a t e  new v a r i a b l e s  a l l o w s  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  
form o f  e l a s t i c  demand. 
L e t  u s  now i n t r o d u c e  a new form f o r  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n ,  
i n  which t h e  e n t r o p y  t e r m  i s  r e p l a c e d  by a more g e n e r a l  u s e r s '  
b e n e f i t  f u n c t i o n .  W e  assume t h a t  t o t a l  b e n e f i t  i s  made up o f  
t h r e e  terms a s  f o l l o w s :  
a t e r m  depend ing  on t h e  f l o w s  
between i and j o n l y  
a  t e r m  depending on t h e  t o t a l  
demand coming from i ( G~ = L s .  . ) 
i 1 I  
a  t e r m  depending on t h e  s i z e  of 
t h e  f a c i l i t y  x and on t h e  t o t a l  j 
demand i t  a t t r a c t s  ( D  = L s i j ) .  j 
Adding up a l l  t h e  above t e r m s  o v e r  i and j and s u b t r a c t i n g  t h e  
u s u a l  t r a v e l  c o s t  g i v e s  u s  a  t o t a l  n e t  b e n e f i t  f u n c t i o n  of  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  form: 
I f  w e  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  (121)  i n  a  g e n e r a l  model 
w i t h  p a r t i a l l y  e x i s t i n g  s t o c k  and n o n l i n e a r  c o s t  f u n c t i o n s ,  w e  
g e t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  mathemat ica l  programming problem. 
max L F~~ (s .  . )  + 1 E ~ ( G ~ )  + H. (Y. + z  rD.1 
11 I J I  - B L Si j  C i j  (122)  i j  i j i j  
s u b j e c t  t o  
L P .  (y. + L . )  + L q i ( z , )  + L h j ( v j  - Yj) 2 R 
j I 1  3  j j 
where the usual definitions and assumptions hold. (The con- 
straints (1 23) and (1 24) are actually redundant, since the 
variables ci and D can be eliminated.) j 
It can be shown that the general solution to (122)-(129) 
has the same properties as those in 1 to iv listed in Section 
3.3.2. 
Model (1 22) - (1 29) can be specialized in many ways. Here we 
will try to show what can be done, with no claim of generality. 
What will be developed is just one of the ways of looking at 
(122)-(128), which in our opinion is a useful one for some 
applications. 
Suppose we have: 
l. 
-F ( S i j )  = ~ S ~ ~ l o g S  the usual entropy term i j i j 
a term similar to the one 
introduced in the elastic 
demand model (62) - (65) ; it 
can be interpreted as a cost 
associated with unsatisfied 
potential demand 
a 
-H. (D.) = B ( X  - D . 1 1 ~  ( X  - D . )  + b , 
I I j I j I j 
a cost term associated with 
the deviation between usable 
capacity and actual demand 
S u b s t i t u t i o n  i n  ( 1 2 2 )  y i e l d s  t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  programming 
problem 
s u b j e c t  t o  
where 
The c o n s t r a i n t  ( 1 3 1 )  i s  a c t u a l l y  r e d u n d a n t  i f  a > 0 ,  b u t  i t  w i l l  
be  u s e f u l  t o  keep  i t  i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  c o r r e c t  form f o r  t h e  l i m -  
i t i n g  cases. .Assuming t h a t  c o n s t r a i n t  (132)  i s  a c t i v e  and  p r o c e e d i n g  
a s  u s u a l ,  w e  o b t a i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  g e n e r a l  s o l u t i o n :  
where 
For an optimal x we further have: 
where ~ ( 0 )  are the functions defined by ( 1 1 9 ) .  A comparison with 
some earlier results is useful. Equations ( 1  3 5 )  and ( 1 3 6 )  look 
like ( 6 6 )  and ( 6 7 ) ,  implying that an elastic demand behavior is 
embedded in the model. Equation ( 1 3 9 )  is basically the same as 
( 1 1 8 ) .  This means that the solution to ( 1 3 0 ) - ( 1 3 4 )  is indis- 
tinguishable from the solution to ( 1  1 2 )  - ( 1  1 7 )  , as far as the sizes 
and locations of facilities are concerned. However, a different 
behavior is implied for the users. From ( 1 3 7 )  it is seen that the 
attraction weight w is proportional to a power of the difference j 
between capacity and attracted demand, and by changing the values 
of the parameters a and b we get a different sensitivity to the j 
deterrence effect of congestion. As a special case, if it can 
be assumed that D is always small, compared to x and all b are j j j 
equal to b, the attractiveness weights are given approximately by: 
with k = e  a B b  
This assumption implies that the system never produces congestion, 
so that we get models related to the ones discussed in Section 
3.2.3. If, on the other hand, a = 0 ,  the terms in x and D j j 
disappear from the objective function (1 30) and constraint (1 31 ) 
usually becomes active. The problem thus reduces to an elastic- 
demand version of model ( 1 1 2 ) - ( 1 1 7 ) . 
In short, we see that model (130)-(134) yields all the 
previously discussed models as special cases, including models 
with elastic demand and models with size-dependent utility func- 
tions. Furthermore, when its parameters do not assume limiting 
values, its general solution is fairly flexible in fitting users' 
behavior, although still consistent with the Neuburger consumer 
surplus formalism. 
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
4.1 General Comments 
A general framework for future research has been outlined 
in Section 2 in broad nontechnical terms. The purpose of this 
section is to add a few technical notes on problems of a less 
general nature, but of some importance to applications. 
Single period (or static), single-level optimal location 
problems are usually supposed to be rather well known and solva- 
ble. However, it can be seen in the preceeding sections how 
poorly solved or unsolved problems can. still be found. This is 
even more true if we give the term "problem" a wider ineaning than 
"optimization problem" and the term "solution" a wider meaning 
than "optimal solution" to a.possible mathematical program. 
Indeed problems of content, form, and algorithms must be solved. 
Problems o f  c o n t e n t  include such topics as physical, behavior, 
and economic assumptions and interpretations; and consistency 
between the models and the aggregation levels they are used for. 
Problems o f  form are concerned with the mathematical tools we use 
to formulate the problems. They range from continuous (rather 
than discrete) to nonlinear (rather than linear) to existence and 
uniqueness analyses. Problems o f  a l g o r i t h m s  are concerned with 
the best ways to solve, or nearly solve, the problems stemming 
from content and form. 
Surprisingly enough, it seems as though people working on 
location problems actually tend to group themselves according to 
the three categories above, with little exchange of information 
among the groups. 
Unification, rather than new models or algorithms, is thus 
the main need, and Sections 3.1 to 3.4 in this paper were guided 
by this idea. However, it must be said that unifying features 
have been sought mainly in the form of problems, while we have 
intentionally been vague about their contents. This happens 
mainly because unifying forms is a realatively easy task, while 
carrying out a satisfactory analysis of contents is the real 
challenge, and it needs a substantial amount of time and effort. 
This is not to say that the models we discussed are useless. 
Indeed, we believe that static, single-level optimal-location 
problems not falling within our models in some way are hard to 
find. What is needed from now on is just to find where each 
problem falls, and how and why. 
The stress placed on contents does not mean there are no 
algorithmic problems. Actually, the most sensible general- 
purpose models, like the ones discussed in Section 3, basically 
need new algorithms. More than this, they need a lot of coordin- 
ation effort with both existing and possibly new algorithms. 
As far as the purely formal problems are concerned, we 
believe that no really new mathematical effort is needed for 
static, single-level problems. If we change from static to 
dynamic and from single to multilevel (or multifacility) problems, 
this is no longer true. However, dynamic multilevel problems 
fall outside the purpose of this paper, and will be the subject 
of future studies. 
Let us now discuss the first two problems posed above in 
greater depth, in order to draft a framework for future research. 
The problem of algorithms is too technical for an introductory 
paper like this. It will be, however, the subject of some forth- 
coming work. 
4.2 Contents 
An optimal location model is made up of an objective function, 
some constraints and, of course, some decision variables. Since 
there is no general agreement on what these components are, a 
brief discussion is necessary, For this purpose it is easier 
to take them in reverse order. 
4 . 2 . 1  The Dec i s ion  V a r i a b l e s  
All location problems have size and location of facilities 
among the decision variables. Some of them also have commodity 
or users' flows. All of them may be different depending on what 
is meant by "location", "facility", and "flows". Because of this 
we believe that research effort is needed in order to: 
I d e n t i f y  t h e  c o r r e c t  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  l o c a t i o n s  f o r  each 
problem. This issue is closely related to the aggrega- 
tion level problem, and particular care must be placed 
on distinguishing the problems with pointwise locations 
from the ones where locations are zones, or subregions 
of a region. 
I d e n t i f y  t h e  c o r r e c t  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f a c i l i t y  f o r  each 
problem.  his problem is tied with the one above, so 
that the "size" of a "facility" in a given location has 
different meanings depending on what the location is. 
It is usually a plant, a building, or a single piece of 
equipment for pointwise locations, while it is an aggre- 
gate of usually many plants, or buildings, or many 
pieces of equipment in zone-like locations. 
I d e n t i f y  t h e  c o r r e c t  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f lows  f o r  each 
problem. As stressed many times through Sections 2 and 
3.1 to 3.4, there is a fundamental difference between 
problems where displacements of goods and people are 
charged to the users and the ones where displacements are 
controlled by the locational decision maker, While in 
the latter case the well known OR plant-location models 
apply (with possible slight variations for each problem), 
in the former case models based on spatial interaction 
t h e o r y  a r e  needed.  R e g r e t t a b l y  enough,  m i s t a k e s  a r e  
o f t e n  made i n  c h o o s i n g  t h e  model t o  be  used .  Even more 
r e g r e t t a b l e  i s  t h e  t endency  o f  p e o p l e  who l i k e  one  
approach  t o  d i s l i k e  t h e  o t h e r  o n e ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  t h e  problem b e i n g  s o l v e d .  A c t u a l l y ,  w e  need 
t o  known which approach  i s  best  s u i t e d  f o r  e a c h  problem,  
and n o t  which i s  "good" o r  "bad". 
4 , 2 , 2  The C o n s t r a i n t s  
A g e n e r a l  agreement  e x i s t s  on t h e  main set  o f  t y p i c a l  con- 
s t r a i n t s  f o r  a  l o c a t i o n  problem. Most o f  them have an  o b v i o u s  
p h y s i c a l  meaning and need n o t h i n g  new. The o n l y  one r e q u i r i n g  
f u r t h e r  p h y s i c a l  and /o r  economic i n s i g h t  i s  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  on 
t o t a l  budge t .  * 
T h i s  i s  main ly  a  problem of  d e f i n i n g  t h e  c o s t s  f o r  a  s i n g l e -  
p e r i o d  l o c a t i o n  p l a n .  The two main r e s e a r c h  i s s u e s  seem t o  be :  
The problem o f  d e f i n i n g  r u n n i n g  and b u i l d i n g  c o s t s ,  
Most l o c a t i o n  models pay l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between c o s t  components which have  t o  be 
summed and d i s c o u n t e d  o v e r  t i m e  ( r u n n i n g  c o s t s  f o r  a 
f a c i l i t y ) ,  and t h e  c o s t  components found once  i n  a 
w h i l e  ( b u i l d i n g  a  new o r  expanding an o l d  f a c i l i t y ) .  
Obv ious ly  enough,  t h i s  ma in ly  happens  b e c a u s e  of  t h e i r  
s t a t i c  n a t u r e .  However, s i n c e  most  s i n g l e - p e r i o d -  
l o c a t i o n  models  have t o  be used  as  s t e a d y - s t a t e  
a p p r o x i m a t i o n s  t o  dynamic p rob lems ,  it may w e l l  happen 
t h a t  c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i s c o u n t e d  r u n n i n g  c o s t s  p r e v a i l  o v e r  
b u i l d i n g  c o s t s ,  as f a r  a s  l o c a t i o n a l  and /o r  r e l o c a t i o n a l  
d e c i s i o n  are concerned .  T h e r e f o r e  a  d e e p e r  a n a l y s i s  o f  
r u n n i n g - c o s t  components i s  needed.  
Another  i s s u e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  problem 
i s  t h a t  of  d e m o l i t i o n .  I n  many l o c a t i o n - r e l o c a t i o n  
problems,  where d e c i s i o n s  have t o  b e  t a k e n  on e x i s t i n g  
* I n  many models  t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  l i k e  a  b u d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t ,  s i n c e  
t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n ,  However, t h e r e  
i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  two f o r m u l a t i o n s ,  a s  f a r  a s  t h e  
meaning o f  t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n s  i s  concerned.  
stock, it may be meaningful to ask whether demolition 
is better than keeping unused stock. This problem needs 
a dynamic setting to be solved; therefore, a deeper 
analysis of this cost component is needed. 
The  p r o b l e m  o f  s c a l e  e c o n o m i e s .  Introducing convex 
nondecreasing cost functions is usually realistic for 
problems with pointwise locations, where it can be 
certain that "a facility" is actually a single facility, 
or plant, or piece of equipment. It is not so sensible 
for problems where locations are zones or subregions, 
since in this case we do not know how total size alloca- 
ted to each zone is spread across it, how many single 
facilities it is made up of, how big each single 
facility is, and so on. In this case, linear costs and 
no fixed charges are probably the best compromise. 
Another issue related to scale economies is the tendency 
toward concentration that these economies usually induce 
in the models. This is a controversial point, since we 
have people thinking that a few big facilities are the 
best solution, and those thinking that social welfare 
and equity require evenly distributed facilities across 
space. 
4 , 2 , 2  The O b j e c t i v e  F u n c t i o n  
As discussed earlier, different kinds of objective functions 
can be found, Two important ones are: 
Functions where costs (benefits) charged to the loca- 
tional decision maker are minimized (maximized) 
Functions where costs (benefits) charged to the users 
are minimized (maximized) 
While the first kind of function poses no really new problem, 
the second kind does. Provided we accept the embedding approach, 
by which maximizing is used both to optimize (a decision maker's 
task) and to induce the appropriate users' behavior, much can be 
told about what appropriate users' behavior is, and how we have 
to embed it in the model. 
The models which embed t h e  l o g i t - c h o i c e  behav ior  a r e  p a r t i c -  
u l a r l y  impor tan t  examples. How t h e s e  can be  g e n e r a l i z e d  and s t i l l  
remain w i t h i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  l o g i t  s t r u c t u r e  has  been b r i e f l y  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  3.4. I t  cou ld  be  u s e f u l  t o  f i n d  more 
g e n e r a l  f u n c t i o n a l  forms,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  l o g i t  a s  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e ,  
b u t  a l l owing  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  behav io r s  a s  w e l l .  
A more g e n e r a l  i s s u e  concern ing  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  i s  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  way t h e  p u b l i c  f a c i l i t y  l o c a t i o n  
problem i s  posed and t h e  economy of t h e  coun t ry  where it i s  posed. 
Although s i m i l a r  i n  t h e  mathemat ica l  form, problems may have ve ry  
d i f f e r e n t  c o n t e n t s  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  The economic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  b e n e f i t s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  c an  be some k ind  of  consumer ' s  s u r p l u s  
a s  w e  have done, t h u s  implying t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  p r i c e s .  These 
a r e  u s u a l l y  nonmonetary p r i c e s ,  exp re s sed  i n  t e r m s  of  u s e r s '  
pe r ce ived  u t i l i t i e s  ( o r  d i s u t i l i t i e s ) .  Th i s  i s  imp l i ed  i n  t h e  
random u t i l i t y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  models based on t h e  l o g i t -  
behav ior  assumpt ion (see Neuburger, 1971; MacFadden, 1973, 1974; 
Wil l iams,  1977; and Van L ie rop  and Nijkamp, 1979 among o t h e r s ) .  
A c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  problem i s  whether p u b l i c  f a c i l i t i e s  
shou ld  cha rge  a c t u a l  d i r e c t  money p r i c e s  t o  t h e  consumers,  i . e . ,  
shou ld  t hey  be prof i t -making,  s e l f - f i nanc ing ,  o r  shou ld  t hey  j u s t  
e x p l o i t  a  g iven  budget  t o  maximize s o c i a l  b e n e f i t  on ly .  I n  t h i s  
s e n s e ,  having t o t a l  c o s t  i n  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  
a  budget  c o n s t r a i n t  makes a  d i f f e r e n c e ,  a l t hough  t h e  Lagrangian 
f u n c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  two problems look  t h e  same, 
A t h i r d  impor t an t  i s s u e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  i s  
t h e  problem of e m p i r i c a l l y  f i t t i n g  t h e  impl ied  consumers '  behav ior  
models on a c t u a l  d a t a .  Th i s  problem i s  sha red  by a l l  t h e  formu- 
l a t i o n s  where some k ind  of  e l a s t i c  o r  p r i c e  s e n s i t i v e  demand i s  
assumed, whether  t h e s e  models embed consumers'  behav io r  by 
Neuburger ' s  consumer s u r p l u s  maximizing ( t h u s  producing s t and -  
a r d  s p a t i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  mode l s ) ,  whether t hey  have demand func- 
t i o n s  i n  t e r m s  of  a c t u a l  money p r i c e s ,  o r  whether  t hey  u s e  any 
o t h e r  t h e o r e t i c a l  approach.  
4.3 Form 
A s  p r e v i o u s l y  s t a t e d ,  t h e r e  a r e  no r e a l l y  new problems a s  
f a r  a s  t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  form of  a  s t a t i c  l o c a t i o n  model i s  con- 
c e r n e d .  T h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  f o r  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  ( n o n - s e n s i t i v e -  
demand) p l a n t - l o c a t i o n  p rob lems ,  f o r  which a l a r g e  amount o f  
t h e o r e t i c a l  and c o m p u t a t i o n a l  work h a s  been c a r r i e d  o u t ,  and 
r e f e r e n c e  c a n  be made t o  v e r y  good e x i s t i n g  s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t  
and b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l  works on t h a t  t o p i c  (see R e V e l l e  e t  a l .  1 9 7 0  
and Lea, 197 9,  f o r  i n s t a n c e )  . 
There  a r e ,  however some t e c h n i c a l  problems t o  b e  s o l v e d  f o r  
t h e  more g e n e r a l  models  d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n s  3.3.1,  3 .3.2,  and 
3.4,  which i n c i d e n t l y ,  t u r n  o u t  t o  be t h e  most  i n t e r e s t i n g  and 
u s e f u l  ones  i n  my o p i n i o n .  They a r e  l i s t e d  and b r i e f l y  d i s c u s s e d  
below 
N o y ~ c o n c a v i t y  and u n i q u e n e s s  p rob l ems .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
t h e  b e n e f i t  f u n c t i o n  ( t o  b e  maximized) i s  u s u a l l y  con- 
c a v e * ,  and t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n s  are  a l s o  concave ,  T h i s  
r e s u l t s  i n  a nonconcave programming problem,  whose 
s o l u t i o n  may n o t  be u n i q u e  (and u s u a l l y  it i s  n o t )  and 
whose Kuhn-Tucker p o i n t s  need n o t  be  o p t i m a l  o n e s ,  Some 
e x i s t e n c e  and u n i q u e n e s s  work c o u l d  be  u s e f u l ,  b o t h  f o r  
t h e  g e n e r a l  model and f o r  i t s  v e r s i o n s  assuming meaning- 
f u l  s p e c i a l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  
Dual f o r m u l a t i o n  and a n a l y s i s .  The development  o f  t h e  
d u a l s  o f  o u r  g e n e r a l  n o n l i n e a r  models  s h o u l d  be c a r r i e d  
o u t  i n  o r d e r  t o  f u l l y  e x p l o r e  t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s .  T h i s  
s h o u l d  g i v e  n o t  o n l y  m a t h e m a t i c a l  i n s i g h t  and computa- 
t i o n a l  h i n t s ,  b u t  a l s o  b e t t e r  p h y s i c a l  and economic 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .  
E x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  s p e c i a l  s t r u c t u r e s .  P r o v i d e d  enough 
f l e x i b i l i t y  i s  p r e s e r v e d ,  some mean ingfu l  s p e c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e s  s h o u l d  be i n t r o d u c e d  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  f u n c t i o n s ,  
* I f  t h e  problem i s  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  t e r m s  of  c o s t  min imiz ing ,  
t h e  u s e r s '  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s u a l l y  convex,  w h i l e  t h e  c o s t  
f u n c t i o n s  i n  t h e  budge t  c o n s t r a i n t  a r e  concave .  T h i s  r e s u l t s  
i n  a  nonconvex programming problem. 
both in the objective function and in the budget con- 
straint. "Entropy" terms and power functions are an 
example (which has to be fully analyzed as yet). Some 
effort should be made towards finding other useful 
functional forms for users' benefits, or costs (other 
than the entropy form), as well as other functional 
forms which can best model the scale-economies' effect. 
Anyway, the theoretical work on special structures 
should be carried out in close conjunction with the 
empirical work of fitting actual data to users' 
behavior (as discussed in Section 4.2). 
4.4 Issues for Further Research 
The main conclusion which can be drawn from Sections 2 and 
3 is that some model-building work is needed to account for some 
important features of real facility location problems. 
The question of demand sensitiveness to accessibility and 
congestion is the new leading d e s c r i p t i v e  issue. The unsatisfac- 
tory state of the theory and the relevance in applications ask 
for developing new effective approaches to this issue. It is 
therefore proposed as one of the next steps in PFL research. 
The problem of finding exact and approximate solution tech- 
niques to the newly posed location problems is the leading a p p l i e d  
I 
issue. Expected results in this direction are outlined below: 
Efficient ways of handling nonlinear objective functions 
(based on the spatial-interaction embedding approach) 
Efficient procedures to cope with nonsmooth features 
arising from real problems (such as fixed charges, 
bounds on feasible sizes, and indivisibilities) 
Computational schemes to analyze sensitivity of loca- 
tional patterns to benefit/cost trade-off changes and 
travel cost changes. A comparative analysis of numer- 
ical results with some real cases will be carried out, 
in order to test the procedures and techniques outlined 
above 
The problem of modeling new dimensions in location problems, 
like those in multilevel multiactivity and multistage (dynamic) 
systems, is the main new theoretical issue. It will also be of 
great applied value, since multiactivity dynamic models are the 
best ones suited for real urban service systems. A promising 
contribution along these lines should be the development of a set 
of spatial-interaction based indicators, monitoring the changes 
in the system and pointing out management policies (including 
capacity expansion, demolition, and relocation) for the stocks 
of urban service facilities. Of course, this development is not 
a short-term one, and it also tends to stretch the boundaries of 
the PFL Task. It is felt therefore, that the development of these 
approaches will lead to suggestions for new interdisciplinary 
research on urban systems, which are hoped to be useful for 
possible future tasks within an urban management theme. 
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